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سال شانزدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 88، بهار و تابستان 1402)

This article deals with the place of imagination in the philosophy of Richard Rorty. Imagination is thought to play a key role in his philosophy and understanding its place in his thought can help us understand the true mission of his philosophy. It seems that Rorty is trying to replace imagination with reasoning. We show that this alternative arises from the logical necessity of Rorty’s philosophy so that such an initiative can be considered in line with his critical view of the idea of “truth” and replacing it with the idea of “justification”. From this point of view, imagination can provide the ground for progress, hope and social solidarity by creating alternatives for existing situations. In this article, in the form of the place of imagination in Rorty’s thought, an attempt is made to examine the idea of imagination and its place in relation to the key concepts of Rorty’s philosophy, including hope, social solidarity and democracy. It seems that imagination is a key concept in Rorty’s philosophy, and this philosopher can implement his project under the title of new pragmatism only by relying on the element of imagination as a substitute for the reason.

The Gettier problem is a set of counter examples that challenges the standard definition of knowledge within epistemology before the second half of the 20th century. According to the standard definition, which we call JTB, knowledge is nothing more than a justified true believing. The problem, roughly, is that the standard definition does not include the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge, since there might be some counter examples that are not cases of knowledge, even if they are cases of justified true believing. Since then epistemologists have gone to a lot of trouble to avoid, or resolve, or even to deny, the Gettier problem. One of the main efforts to resolve the problem has been done by a theory called externalism which has two main forms: causal theory and reliabilism. Reliabilism considers the concept or the condition of justification as the main source of the Gettier problem and tries to replace it, accordingly, with a second and different one, i.e. a reliable process. This concept or condition is focused on the role of an external process that creates mostly the true beliefs in a person. This article argues that the externalist- reliabilist proposal is not capable of resolving the Gettier problem.

In the second edition of his book Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A New Outlook on Elements of Logic, Mortaza Hajhosseini has made some claims about previous logics, which seem to be inaccurate. These claims are as follows: 1. Classical logic confuses inference and material implication and considers them as one. 2. Classical logic does not distinguish between truth-functional and non-truth-functional logical systems. This distinction between these two systems is his invention and has no historical background in the works of previous logicians. 3. The Deduction Theorem is incorrect because the relation of premises is the extentional conjunction. We show that all of these claims are incorrect. Furthermore, we attempt to compare some of the systems proposed in this book to some non-classical systems.

This paper analyzes and criticizes Swanson’s position on the relationship betweenthe predictive processing paradigm (hereafter called PP) and Kant’s philosophy. According to Swanson, this paradigm is rooted in the works of Immanuel Kant. He explains and demonstrates this connection in cases such as (1) top-down analysis, (2) the mind and causal structures of the world, (3) reversal and the Copernican revolution, (4) hyperpriorities and forms of intuition, (5) generative models and schemata, and (6) analysis by synthesis. In evaluating his point of view, we demonstrate that his claim encounters difficulties in at least two general instances: first, his reading of PP is completely selective, and he does not consider the significant differences between different readings. Second, his reading of Kant is naturalized and experimental. Such a reading disregards and wipes out the most basic concepts of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, that is, the self or self-conscious subject. Besides, Kant’s approach to the mind is metaphysical, while PP’s approach to the brain is completely empirical. Hence, if there is a fundamental conflict between the PP paradigm and Kant’s transcendental philosophy, then the assertion of compatibility between them faces serious difficulties.

This article follows Heidegger’s criticism and analysis of Bergson’s philosophy of life. Heidegger’s interest is because Bergson is looking for a way to understand life as it is. In his research, Heidegger considers some of Bergson’s opinions promising, such as paying attention to the concept of time as a key to grasping the truth. Still, he criticizes some of Bergson’s theories, such as the inadequacy of language in understanding life. In general, the results of this research are divided into three parts; In the first part, the concept of time in Bergson’s philosophy is given as a key to understanding life, where Heidegger introduces Bergson as one of the pioneers of modern philosophy. The second part of the article is devoted to the issue of language and the inadequacy of the concept in Bergson’s philosophy. In the third and final part, Heidegger criticizes Bergson’s theories about language and tries to find a way to understand the truth through the concept of time. Attention to consciousness and its connection with life through Bergson’s time or duration is another topic of great importance to Heidegger. Despite all of Heidegger’s criticisms of the philosophy of life, he still considers Bergson’s work as the most promising research and effort to reach the truth.

The basic problem of this research is the analysis of the quiddity of the first propositions (τἀ πρῶτον: to Proton) in Aristotle's philosophy and its purpose is to discover the relation of these propositions with the sextuple self-evident propositions. In Posterior Analytics, Aristotle puts forward the first propositions in response to the problem of epistemic regress. These propositions are known by two characteristics: 1- They are association of knowledge and have its conditions such as completeness and necessity. 2- They have no middle term. In this research, it is revealed that the instance of first propositions in Aristotle's philosophy is more specific than the instance of self-evident propositions; this means that self-evident propositions are more general than these propositions; but on the other hand, the first propositions in Aristotle’s philosophy are more general than "primary premises" in the Islamic philosophy. Among the sextuple self-evident propositions, Aristotle includes two groups of them, i.e. primary premises and natural propositions, under the first propositions. Exclusion of sensory premises and unanimous traditions premises from the first propositions is due to the lack of conditions of knowledge, and the exclusion of empirical and intuitive premises is due to their provability and causality. In Aristotelian philosophy, the cause’s chain of empirical propositions cannot continue indefinitely; but he fails to express the unprovable principles of nature and clarify their meaning. Also, the lack of providing a suitable criterion for distinguishing the first propositions from other propositions seriously challenges his logical-philosophical system regarding the structure of "demonstrative knowledge"