rahmatollah karimzadeh

One of the principles used in Islamic jurisprudence of transactions is the jurisprudential principle of “negation of aleatory sales” or “negation of aleatory” (Arabic: الغرر, al-gharar). Shaykh Anṣārī’, in his discussion on the condition of knowledge concerning the exchange items (considerations) in sales (Arabic: البیع, Romanized: al-Bayʿ) specifically regarding measurable and weighable objects, stated that one of the reasons for the necessity of knowing the considerations and the requirement for measuring the object of sale by quantity and weight is the Ḥadīth prohibiting aleatory sales. He further adds that the comparison of the Ḥadīth on aleatory sales with the narrations regarding measurement and weight indicates that the type of aleatory referred to here is general aleatory. However, in the discussion of the buying and selling of cloth, sheep, and land based on observation, he states that since there is no narration related to specification and measurement, the criterion of personal aleatory applies. The question that arises is what the difference is between the two cases, in one of which a ruling is given regarding general aleatory (Arabic: الغرر, al-gharar), while in the other case a ruling is given regarding personal gharar. Does the mere lack of a reason for necessitating measurement in the second case result in the gharar being classified as personal? This article critically examines the statements of the late Shaykh by descriptively and analytically reviewing the narrations in the issue of measured and weighed items and their connection to the Ḥadīth negating gharar. It establishes the hypothesis that, considering that the establishment of religious rulings (Arabic: الاحکام الشرعیه) occurs as real propositions, and consequently, the existence of a ruling depends on the existence of its subject, in all cases the criterion for the principle of gharar (aleatory), similar to the rule of prohibition of detriment (Arabic: لا ضرر, principle of harm), is personal aleatory, rather than generic aleatory, and there is no distinction between these two matters. Obviously, the difference between the effect of personal gharar and the effect of general gharar will play an important role in the ruling of sales and new unknown transactions, which also guarantees the necessity of this discussion.

Given the different levels of human perception, divine knowledge also includes different levels of understanding and discovery, and humans achieve understanding of multiple layers of knowledge in proportion to their level of understanding. The highest level of perception belongs to the intuitive encounter of the prophets with the truth, others also benefit from this knowledge through their scientific and practical efforts. Although with intellectual development, deeper levels of understanding are achieved for humans, but on the other hand, human perceptive power is limited and it is not possible to understand facts beyond its borders. The content of the narration of the contemplative people is that God revealed the Surah Tawheed and the final verses of Surah Al-Hadid because he knew that in the future there would be people who were contemplative. Some people have interpreted this narration as encouraging and others as condemning. The question of the research is whether contemplation in this narration means the praise or it means the condemnation? In this article, we have analyzed the meaning of this narration and have shown that according to the available evidence, this narration is more about the prohibition of excessive meditation than encouraging meditation

Justice is a prevailing reality in all dimensions of human life, conceptualized in different fields of knowledge including jurisprudence. Jurisconsults have presented various definitions of justice, the most importance of which is the definition of justice as a second nature (malakih). The present study clarifies the definitions of justice provided in jurisprudence, and follows the hypothesis that none of these definitions truly capture the meaning of justice. Some of the definitions indicate and discover the existence of justice, and second nature cannot be accepted as a definition of justice either, due to some shortcomings. In fact, justice is an existential reality derived from Right (ḥaq), both of which are parts of innate human necessities and can be proven by reference to human nature. Performing the obligatory acts (vājibāt) and avoiding prohibited acts (muḥarramāt) leads to the realization of justice. It is not that justice is a second nature that emerges from performing obligatory acts and avoiding prohibited ones. This study is necessary, because elucidating the reality of jurisprudential justice yields scientific benefits in the least.

The important role of waqf (endowment) in religious, moral, cultural, social and economic issues has made it one of the basic jurisprudential issues. The endowment is dividable in different aspects. One of its division is in respect of time. Waqf in terms of time is either absolute or limited. The validity of absolute waqf is accepted by all jurists, but time-bound waqf has not been accepted by majority, although some, not a few, have accepted its validity. The purpose of this article is to examine the question of whether the reasons for the condition of the eternity of waqf can prove this condition, and as a result, the time-bound waqf becomes invalid, or not? After a brief explanation of the temporary and eternal endowment, this study evaluates the reasons for the condition of eternity of endowment in a descriptive-analytical manner and follows the hypothesis that these reasons not only do not limit the validity of the endowment to the eternal endowment. Rather, by reviewing the truth of the endowment and explaining the reasons for the theory of the validity of the temporary endowment, its correctness can be strengthened. Proving the validity of this type of endowment has many fruits that guarantee the necessity of this discussion.

According to the verses and Hadithes, time is one of the most valuable things that a person benefits from in his life. Life is an opportunity and time that is considered as one of the most important divine blessings, for which man is responsible and wasting it will lead to punishment. Given that in the viewpoint of some thinkers, time is an unreal thing, and on the other hand, time, assuming its existence, is a non-optional phenomenon, the question that is raised is how the human responsibility towards time is justified? Analyzing the nature of time from Mullah Sadra's point of view, this article tries to explain philosophically the responsibility of man towards time. The hypothesis of the discussion is that achievement of beatitude, which is the goal of human creation, depends on paying attention to time, life and not neglecting it and using it as much as possible, and in this sense, time is not only an optional matter and a duty, but rather the only way to human beatitude is to use this great blessing that God has given to man. Paying attention to this point can show the reason for the necessity of this discussion.

The realization of endowment (waqf) is conventional in property and concrete objects, but there is disagreement about the endowment of benefits and rights. One of the cases in which there is disagreement is the endowment (waqf) of a part of the actions of a temporary or permanent freeman. This discussion, as far as has been examined is not explicitly seen in the words of the Imami jurists. Its non-expression among Imami jurists may be due to its apparent contradiction with the conditions in which they have considered for endowment (waqf).

But since the extent of endowment (waqf) issues has expanded today and many new examples have been introduced or defined for it, it is necessary to re-review the endowment (waqf) subject and its conditions.

Therefore, the present article is going to analyze the issue of “endowment (waqf) of the action of the freeman” temporarily or permanently.

This research clarifies that according to the definition of endowment (waqf) that can be provided according to today’s conditions, this type of endowment (waqf) is correct and is one of the examples of correct endowment.

The nature and the concept of justice is one of the important issues that have been dealt with regarding to God and His acts and also concerning the universe and above all the man and his personal and social actions. There have been made important discussions about justice so far. What have been discussed in this article is studying justice and its nature in the words of Imam Reza (AS). This study has in an analytic-descriptive way propounded this main question: what is the root and the basis of justice in view of Imam Reza (AS)? The secondary questions: Is justice a contract or something genuine and real? How can justice be exercised and fulfilled in individual acts and society? The thesis is that the basis of justice in view of Imam Reza (AS) is a monotheistic truth and it is identified with the pure reality. So, justice is a reality and noumenal, although it is applied in contract issues, too. The only way to fulfill justice in the individual acts is self-refinement and becoming pious, and realization of justice in the social sphere also depends on the implementation of the laws and commands of Allah and being adhered to in the community.

One of the issues that plays a role concerning legal matters, both in this and the other world (Resurrection), may be regarded as human personality state of this being the same of that, inhamani. The question follows as: what is the criterion for stability of human personality during his/her life in this world, and upon which criterion do we say that the person on the second time is the same person on the first one? Various views have been presented in this field. Having used an analytico-descriptive method, we have studied the issue regarding Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra`s works; According to Suhrawardi, the criterion for the identity of human personality is the soul, while on Mulla Sadras, it lies in one`s mind and body. As is understood, many of Suhrawardi's evidences fail to prove his claim and Mulla Sadra's is not free from ambiguity either.

It has been dealt in this paper with the fact that “thinking” is the act of human “mind”. “Mind” is also one of the faculties of the human soul. Mind is different from intellect and soul. Both intellect and mind are the faculties of the soul. Everything that can be invoked to the faculties of the mind and intellect, it can be invoked to the soul too, weather we believe that the soul has many individual faculties or they are its modes. There are different interpretations in the words of theologians and philosophers about the definition of “thinking”. But all of the philosophers typically agree that “thinking” is both moving from the subject of thinking to the principles and turning again to the subject of thinking. Those who only have confined themselves with the second move, perhaps because the second movement has the first movement in itself, so there is no need to its mentioning. The reason of disagreement in citation of “thinking” to the intellect, mind, or soul, is perhaps for this reason that the attention of the mind is sometimes to the immaterial things, so thinking will be the act of rational soul, and sometimes to the material, so it will be the act of animal soul, that is not to fact that it is the direct act of animal soul, but because the faculties of animal soul help the rational soul in reaching a conclusion.