abstraction

The concept of "abstraction" plays a crucial role in shaping perceptions and defining their boundaries and characteristics. This study explores the evolving meaning and function of abstraction within the context of three philosophical frameworks: the essential view, the principiality of being with a gradation unity approach, and the personal unity approach. In the essential view, abstraction entails separating from material aspects, thereby elucidating the emergence of triple perceptions, various forms of rationality, and the negation of perceptual additions. In the principiality of being with a gradation unity approach, perception is seen as existential and inseparable from the soul, progressing towards transcendence. Abstraction, in this context, involves transitioning from one order of existence to another, separating the perceiver from the perceived. Finally, in the personal unity of being, perception transforms into "appearance," and abstraction refers to the separation of this appearance from hidden or inferior appearances. Through these three perspectives, the process of abstraction moves from plurality towards unity and perception, ultimately converging with the perceptive appearance in the third paradigm.

How to abstract concepts is one of the important issues of epistemology. Among the Muslim philosophers, Allameh Tabataba'i is the first Muslim thinker who has examined this issue independently. Her students - including Misbah Yazdi - have also raised different opinions in this field. According to Allameh, philosophical concepts do not have an objective reference, and a different explanation should be found for the origin of their abstraction (compared to the origin of the abstraction of essential concepts). In his book "Principles of Philosophy and Method of Realism", he believes that "judgment" is the origin of the abstraction of these concepts. Misbah Yazdi, following his teacher, is looking for a way to explain the origin of the abstraction of these concepts, because he considers these concepts to have no objective reference. According to him, the Consciousness of inner states, in addition to mental explorations, is the source of the abstraction of these concepts. In the following article, I have shown that these solutions are not without problems. Also, by examining two philosophical concepts (the concept of Consciousness and effect), I showed that these two concepts have "objective reference" like the substantive concepts and are directly obtained from the immediate knowledge.

Undoubtedly, one of the important topics in the field of epistemology in Islamic philosophy is how to obtain general perceptions for humans. Since the basic element that differentiates human beings from other beings is intellect, the ability to understand rational things is a matter of course for every philosopher. But there is a difference of opinion among the sages in the way of obtaining intellectual perceptions. The root of this long-standing difference is the difference of opinion between Plato and Aristotle in the way of the existence of the universal. The purpose of writing this research is to examine the differences between these two bases and the philosophical fruits of these two theories in different philosophical topics. In this article, using a descriptive-analytical method, an attempt has been made to first clearly explain the opinion of those who believe in the theory of "ideal" and also those who believe in the theory of "abstraction" and then the philosophical fruits of believing in both theories in both fields of ontology. and epistemology to be shown. It should be noted that judging between these two opinions is beyond the responsibility of this article.

The main concern in the discussion of philosophical rationalities is epistemology. Secondary rationalities have an origin in the mind, the question of whether or not these concepts apply outside the mind is important. By what mechanism or process does the mind achieve them? How and in what form is the realization of the rationalities of the second? Allameh Tabatabai knows how to obtain philosophical concepts in two ways: present knowledge and analysis of verdicts in propositions. The relationship between these two methods is not without ambiguity and Allameh has raised both in parallel. He prefers the second way, in the way of realism, he believes that the philosophical rationals of the second are the discoverers of the real world through the relational beings who are in the mind and the exact same. Secondary philosophical intellects have a hierarchy in the way of abstraction and realism that are completely different from each other. In this article, we will examine Allameh Tabatabai point of view with an analytical method.

A knower’s intuitive knowledge (whether the exalted necessary being, or sublime abstract beings, or human beings) of the material thing is among the difficult issues in philosophy, about which thinkers disagree and some believe that knowledge does not belong to material things and some believe contrary to that. Various reasons have been stated for non-intuition, some of which return to the material thing itself, some others return to the features of knowledge, and still some others return to the knower’s characteristics. In this article, we seek to deal with this issue from three angles using the method of explanation and description to investigate how each of them is an obstacle. The result of the study is that the feature of extension and dispersal of material things as well as the feature of abstraction of knowledge and existential relation between the knower and the known does not hinder the attribution of knowledge to material things. This is because, firstly, if material things are extended from one aspect, they are non-extended from another aspect. Secondly, abstraction is not the condition for being known. Thirdly, another type of relationship, such as status, can cause intuition.

The theory of functionalism, one of the topics in the philosophy of mind, considers the mind as a function that converts input into output. According to this theory, by accepting the multiple realization of mental states, mental states can also be found in non-humans. Functionalism is important because it is based on the negation of the abstraction of the soul. On the other hand, Ibn Sina’s psychology has proved both the soul and its abstraction. The argument of man suspended in air (floating man) is among the proofs for the soul. Besides, for proving the abstraction of the soul, he has provided arguments that indicate the negation of bodily characteristics and the physicality of the soul. The functional view has requirements that have been criticized and evaluated based on Ibn Sina’s wisdom. According to the functional theory of the mind, the distinction of people is materialistic, while Ibn Sina’s wisdom considers the abstract soul as the correct criterion. Therefore, according to Ibn Sina’s wisdom, the functional theory of the mind has many fundamental problems that make defending it impossible. Using the analytical-descriptive method, this research seeks to examine the computer theory of the mind and some of its requirements from the perspective of Ibn Sina’s wisdom.

According to Sadr al-Muta'allehin, the soul of man is an abstract ideal being that is corporeal and has stages and levels of analogicity and unity at the same time as multiplicity. One of the levels of this being is the ideal body. Using the descriptive-analytical method, the present paper seeks to introduce the characteristics of the ideal body and how it relates to the elemental body and soul according to Sadr al-Muta'allehin. This research coherently and systematically presents all that Sadr al-Muta'allehin has stated about the ideal body in his works. According to Sadr al-Muta'allehin, the ideal body is invisible, immortal, and attached to the soul; it iconically indicates the properties and essences of the soul. The ideal body is united with the soul and the main body in the sense that the soul firstly and foremostly manages and governs the ideal body, and will be with man in the worldly life, purgatory (Barzakh) and the hereafter.

As for the mind and body, Russell first acknowledges the existence of the universe, and, regardless of the sensory and visual data from objects on the mind, accepts the independent objectivity of the nature of things. But then, by considering this objectivity as non- factual and reducing it to what has given by senses and by the direct experience of the soul, interpreted the objective things differently and seek to bring the object and the mind closer together. Eventually, he reduced mental matters to the physical affairs, and accepts the union of e mind and the brain. Martyr Motahhari, on the other hand, by accepting the abstraction of the soul by reciting Sadr al-Muta'allehin, accepts the effortful unity of the soul, which includes the soul and the body, and rejects any interpretation of perception and memory based on physicalism. In his view, the body and its parts are the perceptual tools  that is performed by the soul. As a result, by adopting the foundations of Islamic philosophy, which were first expressed by Mulla Sadra and represented in Motahhari's works, one can critique Russell's physiological foundations in this regard.

The issue of the abstraction of the soul has always been considered by Muslim thinkers and philosophers due to its fundamental role in philosophical topics such as anthropology, epistemology, teleology, etc. The question of the present study is whether the discussion of the abstraction of the soul is in line with the view of the Qur'an? This article examines the interpretations (exegeses) of the verses cited for abstraction as well as the narrations included in these verses, explaining the Qur'an’s view on abstraction by emphasizing narrative interpretations. Four categories of verses have been cited on the abstraction of the soul: First, the verses that express the creation of the Souls. The second category of verses that refer to the relationship between the Souls and God. The third category of verses refers to inner actions, especially verses that indicate its perception and levels. The fourth group of verses related to purgatory and resurrection, which state that after death and the destruction of the body, the truth of man, taken away (cause to death) by the divine angels, remains and has observations. Many narrations also confirm the abstraction of the soul. The cases in which the appearance of the narrations contradicts the abstraction of the soul can be justified and interpreted for definite and documented reasons. This article deals with this issue with a documentary-library method and with a descriptive-analytical approach.

Philosophical concepts play a significant role in the course of thinking and discovering the truths of what there is. Thus, the connection of philosophical concepts to the external world for discovering the truths of what there is has called the attention of the sages. Some of them have argued that those concepts are mental and thus mentally constructed so that they have no referent in the outside world at all. Others, however, have embraced that they have some sort of referent in the outside world using the terms that “their formation is mental” but “their application is external”. They have thus illustrated how philosophical concepts exist outside in order to avoid the infinite regression in their coming to being -which gave rise to consider them purely mental thus abstract.      The above two terms have been interpreted differently. Some philosophers, for example, proposed copula in order to explain the external application of those philosophical concepts; though, the interpretation through copula does not suffice as an answer and sinks into much obscurity. That is why, in his point of view, Allamah Tabatabaii has suggested a very precise interpretation of copula saying that such concepts exist outside but not separately from their source of abstraction in the external world, that is to say they do not have independent referent outside separate from their subject thus they (the philosophical concepts and their outside subject they refer to) exist in one identical being.    In contrast, Allamah Misbah does not make use of copula, though he embraces the idea that philosophical concepts and their referent subjects exist outside in one identical being. In their essay, the authors have adopted the descriptive-analytic method in order to explain the issue in the two celebrated philosophers .

In Mulla Sadra’s view, knowledge and perception are among abstract notions, and the extent of knowledge is directly related to the strength and weakness of abstraction. In Mulla Sadra’s view, the faculty of illusion is the very reason added to the sensory or imaginational details. According to this definition, thus, illusive perception essentially leads to reduction of abstraction and, accordingly, to weakness of perception. Besides, among the features of illusive perception is indecisiveness and lack of dogmatism. In other words, illusion and illusive perception does not achieve certainty and right knowledge. In addition, illusion is the ruler of the minute animal faculties and tries to take most of those faculties and fulfilling the highest points of desire and anger. Thus, it is in conflict with reason and rational perception, and reason is seeking to limit and modify those faculties. Therefore, the discussion on illusion and illusive perceptions is related to the discussion on error in perception. Here, the research method is descriptive-analytical.

Murtaḍā Mutahharī believes that ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī is the first philosopher in the history of Islamic philosophy who has addressed the quality of abstracting secondary intelligible. He does not mean that this issue has not been paid attention to before ‘Allāma; it can even be said that the main elements of ‘Allāma’s explanation are available in Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn’s words. The elements inspired by Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn’s doctrines in ‘Allāma’s explanation include: 1. Secondary ineligibles are acquired knowledge preceded by presential knowledge; 2. Self-mental knowledge, its faculties and actions as well as sensual perception, are presential knowledge; 3. Studying the process of abstracting secondary ineligibles should be started with one of these presential knowledge; 4. The secondary ineligibles are the product of independent look at the relation between the found phenomena, mental or external.

Throughout history, most philosophers have been incapable of proving the universal conscience of all creatures in a philosophical term; rather, they have denied any conscience in physical entitites, based on some evidences. Transcendental philosophy has made valuable efforts to present a philosophical explanation for this religious teaching, and Mulla Sadra and the followers of transcendental philosophy have attempted to explain it intellectually and rationally. In the present article, through a descriptive-analytical method and using a comparative-critical approach, an explanation of the generalization of understanding to physical entities by considering their non-physical facet has been investigated. The findings of the present research suggest that although Mulla Sadra and many other thinkers have accepted the abovementioned explanation, putting it forward as one of the ways to reconcile the belief in universal conscience of all beings based on the concomitance on the one hand and the acceptance of the reasons for abstractness of knowledge on the other hand, its verity is doubted. However, the writer believes that although one cannot prove the universal conscience of all beings using this reason, we may adduce those Quranic verses and traditions that denote comparatively or essentially the influence of perception in beings to conclude that any being – including material ones – somewhat enjoy knowledge.

The article presents explanation and analysis of plotinus’ abstraction theology. In this theology he tries to get negative knowledge of the God. The meaning of the negation is neither of pure negation or privation but it is based on abstraction which purifies and abstracts one concept from else to attain the exact and true meaning of it. Accordingly, this method of theology is the same as the rational abstraction which deletes the additional qualities of the One in order to arrive rationally to the pure unity of the One. In this manner, as plotinus’ viewpoint , we say what the One is not, but we do not say what it is. Rationally, it may be treated two subjects for the abstraction theology: the first, the critical negation of all positive affirmations which used by man to the God. The second, the critical negation of our negations that is unlimited. In this theology, we have no knowledge or thought of the One, but we know about it from what comes after it. Then, we do not speak of the One, but we speak about it.

The theory of abstraction is one of the most puzzling parts of Avicenna's philosophy. What Avicenna says in many passages about the human intellect's capacity to derive universal knowledge from sense-data seems to plainly contradict passages in the same works about the emanation of knowledge from the active intellect, a separately existing substance. When he maintains that "considering the particulars [stored in imagination] disposes the soul for something abstracted to flow upon it from the active intellect", 1 he appears to combine two incompatible concepts in one doctrine: either the intelligible forms emanate from above or they are abstracted from the data collected by the senses, but not both.

Perception has various kinds, and most important of it is the rational perception. One of the important issues in philosophy is the knowing the identity and understanding how to achieve to it. From the perspective of Avicenna, there are two approaches in this topic. The first one is the theory of abstraction of quiddity from separable accidents. Avicenna believes that perception is the resulting of abstraction from external object and infusion it in the soul. In other word, the soul abstracts sensory forms from their matter and then makes them immaterial. When this abstraction is completed, rational perception will occur. The second one is the theory of the soul's connection with active intellect. There is non-material substance in the universe and it consist the intelligible realities. When the soul is connected to the intellectual substance, the special rational forms designed on the soul. In this article, both approaches are studied and reviewed.

In his Oriental Essays, Ibn-Sina puts away the languge of argument, and presents his philosophy by using fictional language and metaphors. To investigate why Ibn-Sina has used such an artistic language, in this paper, first, we will consider the special function of genere of fiction in Ibn-Sina’s opinion. It will be shown that for Ibn-Sina the imaginary language of poem has exceptional role in moral guiding the addressees of his philosophy. Then, by focusing on the common points between art and morality from Ibn-Sina’s philosophical point of view, the theoretical foundations of studying ethical problems in a framework of art will be examined. After explaining the role of imaginal power in the epistemic process of abstraction, we will show how Ibn-Sina has used an imaginary language to make his moral principles acceptable. Finally, by appealing to imagination as a mediator between sense-perception and intellectual discernment, the relation between vrious aspects and fields of Ibn- Sina’s moral philosophy as another consequence of his use of metaphors and imaginative language will be introduced.

In contradiction to the epistemological status of archetypes, Aristotle proposed the theory of active intellect. Peripatetics following him have had several conceptions of active intellect. Avicenna defined active intellect as an immaterial being and independent from soul, which is the last in the hierarchy of intellects and emanates cognitive and concrete forms into material world and souls. Active intellect emanates comprehended forms into capable souls which are ready to accept the emanation of active intellect through passing the stages of sensory, imaginary and intellectual abstraction. However, some of the Avicenna's intellectual foundations -such as longitudinal relationship between the stages of perception, considering science as an accident, denying the union between the intellect and the intelligible and negating substantial motion- are in contradiction to this epistemic approach and go against abstraction, so knowledge is nothing but emanation of active intellect. This necessitates accepting the independent existence of intelligibles before active intellect, or in other words, accepting archetypes in epistemic dimension, which is denied by Avicenna. Therefore, Aristotle's proposed active intellect which was formed in contradiction to archetypes returns into the theory of archetypes in the developmental course of philosophy.

Mullā Ṣadrā has three different approaches towards knowledge by presence concerning the material existences. On many occasions، he regards the physical matters، including bodies and accidents، out of the realm of knowledge by presence and maintains that they are neither present with themselves nor with another reality and nor another reality can be present with them. On another basis، he maintains that the materials become known with their abstract cause. But، according to the third approach، on various other occasions he has maintained perception and consciousness for all creatures. In this viewpoint، he considers knowledge and existence as equal. Besides، according to him، presence is the precondition for knowledge and in fact the very reality of knowledge. Abstraction is the precondition for presence، as well. Therefore، it becomes necessary for the physical matters to have a kind of knowledge by presence and abstraction، too. Then، we can both speak of the hypothesis of the existence of the known (ma’lūm) with them and the hypothesis of their being set as known to the knowledge by presence. In this paper، we have tried، on the basis of the definitions and the principles that Mullā Ṣadrā has presented about knowledge، to distinguish between his positions in this respect and finally deal with the question as to which saying of Mullā Ṣadrā can be in a well-reasoned way considered as his ultimate and accurate view. According to the reasons presented at the end of the article، the third view and approach is preferred.

Ibn Sina’s approach to the imaginative faculty (quwwah musawwirah, or khayâl) and its stored perceptions is without harmony. This paper tries to examine these different approaches and study this incoherence. In the first step, the Sheikh with respect to the principle thought of mashaei and the process of the knowledge abstraction to acquire self or soul (nafs) perceptions believes that it is necessary the materiality and its capacity for the distinction and recognition of partial imaginative perceptions and also believes the absolute (pure) materiality of imaginative perceptions and its capacity. In his second approach with a serious uncertainty, he criticized the materiality of imaginative perceptions. He affirmed in this position that imaginative representations (forms) should not be physical, unless with changing and evolution of body’s parts and the capacity of these forms mean the imaginative faculty should be changed. But at the end, because of propounding the abstraction of soul (self) perfection and the restriction of its perception to rational generalizations the sheikh could not present the abstraction of the partial imaginative perceptions specifically. The last approach of Avicenna to the imagination and its perceptions should be investigated under his special theory of the unity of soul (self) and its different faculties and also his affirming the inability of the process of the abstraction in acquiring the prime stored perceptions of the imagination. According to this, the sheikh in different positions believes that the imagination has functions and specifications which necessarily make the imperfectness (incompleteness) of the imagination apparently (in a glance look).