A Comparative Study of Theories of QuÔb RÁzi and MullÁ ÑadrÁ concerning Nature of Assent

Urmawi divides acquired knowledge into a simple concept (containing no judgment) and an assent (containing a judgment). This has given rise to the difference of opinion between QuÔb RÁzi and MullÁ ÑadrÁ. The former has objected to Urmawi's definition from different perspectives whereas the latter has answered his objections on the basis of certain philosophical principles. Having studied the two theories, one can infer from Ñadrian philosophy that assent is defined as the mental grasping (or as the reflection in the mind) of the essential forms of external things together with the assertion that the relation of correspondence between the objects and the external reality they represent is true whereas RÁzi considers assent as knowledge together with judgment. The present article studies RÁzi’s objections and ÑadrÁ's answers, thus showing the strengths and weaknesses of RÁzi’s opinion as well as the relations between the two opinions. According to the author, MullÁ ÑadrÁ intends to solve the problems within the logical system through philosophical principles, an approach that is worth considering.