نشریه الهیات و فلسفه معاصر
پیاپی 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1400)

The role of religion in Romantic philosophy has always been a matter of debate. While some scholars consider the Romantic era to be the beginning of secularization of religious concepts, others, especially those belonging to New Historicism, associated Romantic literature with religious debates in the public sphere. But in addition to these historical answers, philosophical answers were also given to this question. Among the philosophical answers, it is stated that the theology of Romantic writers is very similar to what is said in some non-classical theologies, including postmodern theology. In this article, by examining the comparative history of philosophy, I seek to show that examples of protest to God in Romantic literature, especially with the construction of Faust-Promethean heroes in the works of J.W. Goethe, M. Shelley, P. B. Shelley, and Lord Byron, resemble protest theology. What became known as the theology of protest in the twentieth century results from the theodicy of protesting against evil. According to this theodicy, the Almighty God is not necessarily good, but He may manifest His goodness after man's protest. Although Romantic poets probably did not have the same and coherent theological system, nor did they have the same goal of protesting to God, the concept of "protest to God" in their works is similar to what post-Holocaust theologians called. At the end of this paper I will mention that what elements in Romantic philosophy prepared it to protest to God.

The issue of proving the existence of the necessary being and its names and attributes has always been one of the concerns of philosophers and theologians in the Islamic world and is one of the important matters in Islamic philosophy. Therefore, Islamic thinkers have proposed many arguments such as the argument of motion, the argument of soul, the argument of occurrence and the argument of the truthful to prove the essence of the necessary being. For the first time, Ibn Sina proposed the argument of the truthful in a number of his works, and philosophers after him offered interpretations of this argument with slight differences. An important feature of this argument is that it proves the essential nature by eliminating intermediaries. In other words, it goes from essence to essence. In this article, we seek to prove and reveal the semantic range and scope of this argument in relation to names and attributes, and to answer the question: Does the argument of the truthful have the ability to demonstrate names and attributes in addition to proving the divine essence or not? For this purpose, we first deal with the recognizability of attributes and the provability of essence and attributes. Then we will show that the argument of the truthful also proves the names and attributes of the necessary being. The important premise of this issue is that names and attributes are identical with essence.

In the present study, Mostafa Malekian's view on the compatibility of rationality and traditional religiosity is examined. Hence, first the definition of rationality and its types is expressed from his point of view, and then we explain two conceptions of religiosity from his viewpoint: traditional religiosity and critical religiosity. Next, we discuss the compatibility of rationality with either of these two religiosities. Realistically and pragmatically, Malekian finds rationality incompatible with traditional religiosity, but he proposes another kind of religiosity, which fits under "critical religiosity" and calls it "spirituality". In his view, rationality is not only compatible with spirituality, but essentially requires it. In Malekian's theory of "rationality and spirituality", only those theoretical teachings of the religious scriptures are accepted which either the intellect affirms definitively or have an epistemological preference, or although there is no epistemological preference for their own benefit or their opposite, their acceptance has beneficial consequences for the individual. Moreover, only that part of the practical religious teachings is practiced, which helps to reduce one's suffering.

The discussion of the soul and its powers has always been a concern of philosophers. One of these powers is the memory, in the interpretation of which Aristotle and Ibn Sina have chosen two separate paths. Ibn Sina considers memory to be the treasure trove of illusions. In contrast, Aristotle does not mention the power of illusion. Hence, he does not discuss its treasure trove and according to his explanations, he almost equates memory with imagination. In this article, we seek to examine the views of Ibn Sina and Aristotle on the function of memory to show the differences and similarities between the two philosophers. Naturally, we will also determine the extent to which Ibn Sina is affected by Aristotle on the issue of memory. The type of this study is the historiography of thought, extracting opinions from different sources, comparing and critically examining them. The conclusion is briefly that Ibn Sina was influenced by Aristotle in most matters of the soul, but his interpretation of memory differs fundamentally from that of Aristotle. In his interpretation of memory, Aristotle pays special attention to remembrance and the element of time in the formation of memory, but Ibn Sina does not mention the role of time and remembrance.

In the book Ghabz wa Bast Teorik Shariat (Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sharia), Soroush considers religious knowledge to be human and historical, but in a further step, in the book Tajrobeh Nabawi (Expansion of Prophetic Experience), he considers religious experience and even religion itself to be human. In the third stage of his intellectual life, he calls the Quran "the book of the Prophet", because he speaks of the expansion of religion as a result of the expansion of the inner and outer experience of the Prophet, and considers the prophetic revelation to be subject to the character of the Prophet. In order to maintain the dynamism of religion, Soroush puts forward the idea that is the central position of the Prophet's human personality in religious legislation and experience and the role of his guardianship in the continuation of religiosity. In this way, he replaces the authority of the Prophet with the authority of the text and even refers the authority of the text to the Prophet. In this regard, Soroush gives an example from the mystical tradition in Islam that the mystics made the heavenly dimension of the Prophet's existence heavier, and, in turn, erased his earthly dimension in the heavenly light of revelation, and exalted the Prophet from an esoteric and spiritual dimension, so that, according to Soroush, his human aspect was neglected. In this article, we examine two basic issues with a critical analytical approach; First, the replacement of the authority of the text, and second, an analysis of the foundations of the authority of the Prophet.

Jawadi Amoli's theory of religious science, which he believes is the solution to the problem of the conflict between science and religion, has been severely criticized. The question of why this theory has been criticized so much is at the heart of this article. This theory seems to be based on assumptions, concepts and approaches that are different from the assumptions, concepts and approaches of those who believe in the conflict between science and religion, and this difference is the source of misunderstandings and an obstacle to the acceptance of his theory. In this article, citing Jawadi Amoli's texts, I have mentioned some of these assumptions, concepts and approaches. Some of the differences are as follows: the traditional view of the structure of science, the one-way relationship between science and philosophy, a certain and different personal perception of "science" along with the theological approach and perspective to the issue of science and religion. They can explain the origins of some of the objections to this theory and show that any solution to the problem of science and religion must address these differences.

In the field of religious knowledge, several arguments have been presented to prove the necessity of religion from a theological and philosophical perspective. The present article examines and analyzes the arguments for the necessity of religion from the perspective of wisdom and grace from the viewpoint of some scholars. This study, more like the theologians' method, while defining the concept of prophet with a logical structure, presents two arguments, the first of which is an argument based on the wisdom of God, stating that the purpose of human creation was expediency and benefit to human beings. In this regard, some scholars believe in the legislative will, and some believe in the divine generative will, and some return the ultimate cause to the efficient cause, and some to the will of the Prophet and the guardian. That is, the wills occur in the soul of the prophet and the guardian since the will of God is not the place of events that need the legislative will. In other words, there are wills about human beings in the soul of the prophet or guardian, but they belong to the interests of the people themselves and go back to them in terms of duties and prove the necessity of religion and prophecy through the necessity of fulfilling the interests in God's wisdom. The second argument is the argument based on grace, which considers revelation to include grace in intellectual duties and to be a condition in auditory ones. This argument, after examining two propositions about the grace of revelation in intellectual duties and its condition in auditory duties, explains and proves the necessity of religion and the prophet.

Intentionality is one of the main characteristics of mental states based on which mental states are related to objects. Hence, one of the issues of the philosophy of mind is to explain this feature.  The present article examines two relevant aspects of this subject, namely, the possibility of intentionality and how to determine mental content. In the first aspect, we explain the possibility of intentionality based on the doctrine of physicalism, and then we talk about how the mental content is determined, which is the semantic feature of intentionality. According to causal theories, its content and method of referring to the outside of the mind and brain are determined by the causal cause or circumstances of its creator. Thus, mental representations i.e. our thoughts have meaning in terms of the causal relationship between them and the part of the world they refer to, and in this way, a natural and physical explanation can be given in terms of intent and content. In this article, after stating the foundations of this theory, namely intentional realism, and naturalism, we discuss and evaluate the two main interpretations of causal theories, namely Fodor's asymmetric dependence and Dal Dretske's semantics. The most important drawbacks of causal theories in both interpretations are the inability to explain the content and meaning of logical and philosophical concepts, as well as non-existent concepts, systematic error, and future beliefs. Fodor's interpretation is ambiguous in the delivery of information, and Dretske's interpretation of the analogy between our knowledge and beliefs with the causal circumstances that give rise to them is problematic. Consequently, both interpretations are incomplete.

René Descartes (1596-1650), the French philosopher and reviver of Western philosophy, based his philosophy on grammatical skepticism and the abandonment of all previous beliefs, even his own objective existence. He then came to his first definitive belief i.e. his own existence as "I think," by relying on the undeniable intuition known as Kezito, manifested in the proposition "I think, therefore I am". Afterward, he argued for the existence of God through the thinking soul, and considered the real existence of God, in addition to the assurance of divine power and will and the certainty that God is not deceitful, as the guarantor of the correctness of other conventional beliefs and scientific and philosophical doctrines. Descartes gave three reasons for the existence of God, the first of which is the "Trademark Argument". This article discusses this argument using authentic translations of some of Descartes' works. It will then briefly explain the criticisms leveled at this argument during Descartes' time as well as his answers, and finally evaluate the body of the argument and its criticisms and responses.

Explaining the relationship between the divine essence and the divine attributes has always been one of the concerns of Islamic theologians and philosophers. In the meantime, Dawani considers the attributes of perfection inseparable from the essence and tries to prove the objectivity of the divine essence and attributes with many reasons. As for this issue, he emphasizes that all the attributes of the necessary being should be referred to the divine knowledge, and he explicitly maintains that all the divine attributes are interpreted in the light of the necessary being's knowledge. On the other hand, Sadr al-Din Shirazi also believes in the objectivity of attributes and essence and has explained and studied the principles of objectivity of essence and attributes through rules such as the principality of existence and the simplicity of truth. What distinguishes Dawani and Sadra Shirazi's views on this issue, and based on which their explanations and reasons differ, is Dawani's belief in the principality of quiddity and Sadra's belief in the principality of existence. This can be considered as the basis and presupposition of the issue of the relationship between the essence and attributes of the necessary being in the thought of Dawani and Sadr al-Din Shirazi. This article examines the views of Dawani and Sadra Shirazi by studying and reflecting on their various works. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the views of Dawani and Sadr al-Din Shirazi and to compare their principles.

In reviewing the Quranic salvation, the first and most significant issue that every reader of the Quran faces is the abundance of verses in which words such as "salvation", "prosperity", "redemption", "happiness", etc. are mentioned, and the salvation of man is considered to be the main goal of the divine messengers. Ibn Sina, who deals with mysticism and Sufism in the final sections of the book Esharat wa Tanbihat (Signs and Punishments), says that mystics, with the help of their perfect souls and passing positions and degrees, and performing austerities with the aim of controlling Nafs Ammarah (inciting soul), have set foot in the holy world and have been drawn to subtle thoughts that are compatible with the sacred. Influenced by the Quran and mysticism, the scholars of intellectual sciences have explored and reflected the idea of salvation in their works. Ibn Sina scrupulously explains the terms of Sufism, the degrees of mystics and their characteristics, and he can be considered as a model for the scholars after him, such as Suhrawardi. Suhrawardi, who himself has deep mystical tendencies, has spoken of salvation everywhere in his relics. In this study, with a comprehensive and wide-ranging view, the idea of salvation in the triad of Quran, mysticism and conclusive argument is examined and compared. With this approach and attitude that the heavenly saying, the mystery of knowledge and wisdom are inseparable, this article mentions the words of the philosophers about the mystics and shows that the Quranic, mystical and argumentative views about salvation are all in harmony.

Mental impressions and images are considered as things that are frequently used in various forms to prove the essence of the soul. In the meantime, Hume believes that human truth is a bundle of mental impressions and images that follow each other in a series, and beyond them, there is no substratum called sensual essence. Therefore, the bundle-like view of mental impressions is a serious obstacle to proving the sensual essence through mental impressions. The root of this denial lies in Hume's rejection of the essence itself because according to his epistemological principles, we do not have a category called impression essence, and in turn, we have no idea of ​​it. In this article, we prove that it is not possible for the "soul", the "mind" or the "I" to be merely a series of impressions without any underlying essence. To do this, while introducing two categories of epistemological and metaphysical objections to the bundle-like view of the soul, we critique the whatness of essence from the perspective of proponents of the bundle theory, as well as their reason for rejecting essence.  Finally, we formulate an argument to prove the existence of soul in the field of the mentioned view.