problem of evil

The problem of moral evil and the quality of its justification within the framework of the best order is one of the fundamental challenges in philosophy of religion. During the early period of writing as a critic, Kant provided three arguments in defense of the theory of the best possible world, which indicates his transition from theoretical wisdom to practical wisdom. Following a descriptive-analytic approach, this paper initially examines the possibility and rationality of the theory of the best possible world in Emmanuelle Kant’s philosophy, which is based on the principles of practical wisdom. Then it deals with its consistency with the theories of Imāmīyyah mutikallimūn. Generally speaking, based on Shīʻī principles, two theories of “the best possible world” and the “only possible world” can be presented. Here, the authors have focused on the theory of the best possible world as the ultimate theory because of the inconsistency of causal necessity with the Will of God, as the creator of this world. Moreover, Kant’s conceptual reinterpretation of the “the best possible world”, which, based on Imāmīyyah verses and traditions, is consistent with the attribute of divine wisdom and God’s purpose of creating humanity, is propounded as an acceptable theory.

The problem of evil in Berkeley’s thought is a complex yet fundamental issue. The lack of clarity and dispersion in its definition has led to ambiguity in understanding Berkeley’s thought accurately. In this article, using an analytical-descriptive method and relying on Berkeley’s metaphysical foundations, an attempt has been made to carefully examine Berkeley’s responses to the problem of evil. In his effort to provide a distinct version of the problem of evil, Berkeley does not regard evil as an independent fact but rather as derived from a form of human value judgment. He considers the labeling of individuals as evil and the classification of actions as evil to be the result of human cognitive limitations and mental constraints. This article aims to demonstrate how Berkeley, by utilizing the his principles of idealism, explains the problem of evil and, from this perspective, offers a solution to the common contradictions in the religious and philosophical doctrines.

The human catastrophes of World War II, along with the experience of the Holocaust—occurring after the dominance of Enlightenment rationality and its associated values—gave rise to profound existential and philosophical questions. These inquiries led to the emergence of a robust discourse on evil within the Western philosophical and theological traditions. In this context, atheistic philosophers questioned the rationality of traditional theism and its approach to the problem of evil. Additionally, anti-theodicy movements emerged, condemning any attempt to justify evils as shameful and morally indefensible. Against this backdrop, Jewish and Christian theologians, along with theistic philosophers, engaged in a reevaluation of their religious traditions, offering more resilient responses to the problem of evil. However, in the Islamic world, scholars have shown relatively little interest in such a reexamination. This paper provides a brief survey of contemporary works on Islam and the problem of evil, demonstrating that the few existing studies often reiterate classical and traditional responses or dismiss the discourse on evil as a Western and foreign concern. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that Islamic theology still needs to address the existential and human dimensions of evil and to offer practical responses to this enduring challenge.

The primary challenge in addressing the problem of evils is the limitation of human knowledge in comprehending its intricate dimensions. This challenge arises from the significant role that God is perceived to play in either causing or permitting certain evils. While human beings lack the epistemic capacity to fully grasp God''''s purposes and the manner of divine intervention, God is understood as omnipotent and omniscient. Consequently, the limitations of human knowledge prevent a precise and comprehensive understanding of the complex dimensions of the evils we encounter in life. Some scholars have referred to this perspective as skeptical theism. Advocates of this approach seek to counter atheistic arguments that reject God''''s existence on the grounds of the apparent absence of rational justifications for evils—particularly gratuitous evils. They argue that our epistemic limitations in discerning God’s reasons for allowing certain evils do not imply that such reasons do not exist. This study employs content analysis to demonstrate that, while emphasizing our epistemic limitations in understanding the problem of evil is somewhat effective in challenging atheistic arguments, excessive reliance on epistemic skepticism regarding divine intervention leads to a broader form of epistemic skepticism. As a solution, this paper proposes recognizing the diverse epistemic capacities of human beings, emphasizing the significance of a God endowed with absolute attributes, and utilizing these attributes to engage with the problem of evils.

The suffering caused by gender discrimination has led to a specific type of the problem of evil, and consequently, it has created structures in society where women are consistently placed in a lower position compared to men, resulting in their deprivation of nurturing their inherent talents. Part of the factors shaping these structures are beliefs influenced by philosophical and mystical perspectives on humanity and the world. This paper aims to examine the issue of gender in the metaphysics of Ibn ʿArabi, addressing the question of whether deep-seated gender distinctions can have roots in the system of creation. Based on the conducted analysis, the concept of duality from Ibn ʿArabi’s viewpoint permeates all levels of existence, from the divine realm to the realm of creation, establishing a fluid relationship between the two active and passive elements of existence, which correspond to the masculine and feminine elements, and it is not possible to draw a stark boundary between femininity and masculinity.

The problem of evil and how it is incorporated into divine decrees is one of the most significant issues in Islamic philosophy. One of the most well-known responses to this issue is the theory of the fivefold division of beings attributed to Aristotle by Muslim philosophers. According to this view, evils are a necessary and inseparable part of the material world. Therefore, despite the possibility of such evils occurring, the world should still be created, as avoiding these minor evils is only possible by not creating the world at all—a solution that Islamic philosophers consider equivalent to abandoning immense good and committing significant evil. Through a deductive and a priori argument, they attempt to demonstrate, using quantitative calculations, how evils are minimal compared to goods in both human and non-human realms. In contrast, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, by criticizing Islamic philosophy on this matter, argues that evils are not an inevitable part of the world, nor is refraining from creating the world to avoid these evils a significant evil. Using an inductive and empirical approach, similar to Islamic philosophers, he tries to show through quantitative calculations that most humans suffer from numerous evils and are deprived of various pleasures. Thus, contrary to the numerical calculations of Muslim philosophers, the claim that goods are predominant is false. This paper, structured through a descriptive-analytical approach, primarily focuses on Ibn Sīnā 's perspectives to present the view of Islamic philosophy and then examines Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 's critiques. Ultimately, it demonstrates that while Fakhr al-Razi fundamentally disagrees with Muslim philosophers on the rationale behind the existence of evils in the world, they share a common limitation in lacking or neglecting a qualitative and human-centric perspective in analyzing this issue.

One of the critical issues addressed by David Griffin, which has been a significant concern for him, is the question of divine benevolence and its relation to the problem of evil. This paper employs an analytical and argumentative approach. We aim to engage with Griffin’s assertion that, contrary to popular belief, God’s benevolence contributes to the existence of evil in the world. Griffin argues that a benevolent and creative God encourages the world to experience higher and more thrilling values, moving it beyond a state of stagnation and inertia. However, this divine intention leads to the existence of evil, as every being, in its alignment with God’s overarching purpose of achieving greater good for the world, possesses self-determining power, which inherently brings the risk of evil. In another view, Griffin maintains that God, faced with such evils, is a companion to human suffering rather than a mere observer of worldly evils. This study concludes that Griffin’s view is ultimately indefensible due to its minimization of moral good in favor of aesthetic good, and the prevalence of evil in the world resulting from a God who is not omnipotent.

 The most natural result of Hume's philosophy is his explanation of the existence of God. That God does not exist. However, recently researchers are trying to moderate Hume's contradictory approach to the existence of God, and to show that Hume accepts the existence of God. This has been done, mainly, by relying on another reading of Hume's attitude to the design argument. This article, for the first time in the scientific community, wants to criticize the new explanation of our commentators with Hume's naturalistic explanation through our belief in the existence of body, and also by applying Hume's skeptical and naturalistic principles.  

The problem of evil has always been a challenge against theism and there has been a lot of disputation about it. What can be considered as a newer challenge to theism is the very problem of divine hiddenness. There are multiple similarities between the two arguments which have caused some thinkers to reduce one to another and to count only one of them as original. It is possible that one of the very concepts of evil or hiddenness be reduced to another one, or one of the arguments that is grounded on them, or the reduction occurs in both phases. Regarding the vastitude of the domain of each problem, what we solely aim at is inspecting the reasons of ones who hold that divine hiddenness is nothing but one articulation of the problem of evil and it is not necessary to be regarded as independent. These reasons range from a sort of resemblance of their logical structure, methodology, conclusion, or responses in order to show that either the problem of divine hiddenness is not independent at all or if it is, it makes a much less severe case against theism in comparison to the problem of evil so it’s not worthy of any concern. What will be eventually concluded is that despite having plentiful available similarities, this kind of reduction is not justified and each problem, regardless of their ability to prove what they claim, is independently precious, inspection-worthy, and original.

The problem of Evil and its solution has long been the concern of thinkers of various schools and methods because evil disrupts the field of religious beliefs and attacks religious beliefs. The Holy Qur'an also deals with the issue of evil in several verses. The issue of evil in the Quranic worldview is different from the view of religious scholars. The theologians, while considering the existence of evil, tried to provide a solution for this problem and by stating the divisions of evil, have stated a solution for each division. The point in common between the theological view and the Qur'anic view is that some Imamiyya theologians have considered evil wisdom to be the test. However, the Qur'anic view has dissociations with the theologians' view. The method of the Holy Quran in processing the problem of evil is in such a way that it basically prevents the occurrence of common problems in human view. In the Qur'anic view, there is no equality between evil and adversity. In the Holy Qur'an, God refers to the necessity of redefining the concept of evil so that it is necessary to free the concept of evil from the humanistic criterion. The criterion of being evil is not being contrary to human nature; Rather, in order to distinguish between good and bad things, one should pay attention to the end of the action and examine the course of the action from the time of doing the action to achieving the result. The Holy Qur'an has stood against the idea that man is confined in worldly life and considers the criterion of an action evilness to be the "consequence" of the action in the "rest" world. Because the divine wisdom of human creation is not to be blessed in this mortal world and to indulge in worldly blessings. 

Generally speaking, Kant’s academic life is divided into two pre-critical and post-critical periods. Some researchers have explored the historical development and evolution of his philosophical thoughts and divided the critical period into two parts as well. An explanation of Kant’s view of the problem of evil, given the difference in the subtle view that is witnessed in his works published in the early and late critical period, portrays the process of the formation of his philosophical structure in this regard. Related studies in this field reveal his gradual distance from the theoretical knowledge of God and, thus, his theological response to the problem of evil, which reached its culmination towards the end of the critical period. The principle of “freedom”, which is one of the postulates of ethics in Kant’s critical thoughts, is the axis of the justification of moral evil in his works, particularly during the later critical period. Following a descriptive-analytic method, the present study investigates Kant’s view of the problem of evil during two critical periods. In the early critical period, he confirmed the theory of the “best possible world”, while equating the concept of “perfection” with the concept of “reality” therein. However, in the late critical period, he moves away from the common definition of “evil and good” and presents a new response to the dilemma of evil through denying the legitimacy of philosophical theodicies. During the critical period, Kant viewed evil as an essential feature of Man and denied the traditional and Stoic interpretation of the temporal and rational origins of evil in human nature.

Experimental philosophy is a new approach in analytic philosophy emerging in the last decade. Experimental philosophy emphasizes the intuitions of ordinary people and compares them with philosophers' intuitions to understand and analyze philosophical problems. One important philosophical and theological issue that can be addressed with such an approach is the problem of evil. Since in the philosophy of religion, the problem of evil is raised in two logical and evidential forms, the research questionnaires were designed to cover both accounts, although more emphasis was placed on the evidential problem of evil. The statistical population of this research was 100 people from different social groups who did not have special studies in philosophical and theological fields. The findings of this research show that the public's sympathy with the logical account of the problem of evil is more than their sympathy with the evidential one. However, the ratio between the answers and all the questions indicates a significant inconsistency in the folks' understanding of the problem of evil and its relationship with theism.

Verses 60 to 82 of Al-Kahf Sureh narrate the story of the meeting between Moses and Khidr. The events taking place while these two divine figures meet have been discussed or documented in the form of views expressed in the science of jurisprudence, ethics, education, theology, etc. The present paper, organized as a descriptive-analytic report, tries to infer the belief implications and to respond to doubts stemmed from some of the verses narrating the story. Exegetical works, with a theological approach, have addressed this topic in a scanty brief manner. Meanwhile, it is to be noted that the articles written about the mentioned verses mostly lack a theological approach. They rather deal with this topic from a moral, educational and mystical perspective. The present paper focuses on religious teachings that can be directly and indirectly deduced from the Qur'anic verses without reference to extra-Qur'anic reports and conflicting presuppositions. The most important religious implications of the verses in question can be listed as follows: the possibility that some people have the knowledge of the unseen world emanated from the divine source, the obligations attached to some types of occult knowledge of the God’s elected people, confirmation of the verbal rule of grace, deciphering the wisdom of some unfortunate phenomena and an answer to doubts stemmed from the problem of the evil.

The problem of evil is one of the ancient questions of mankind. Why does God, or the being who is the creator of the world, not do anything to remove human suffering? In non-monotheistic religions, the problem of evil is not raised much because of the special and often evil nature of gods. But with the growth of human thought, this issue was raised in a more tangible way for humans. One of the most interesting solutions in this regard can be seen in Zoroastrianism. According to Shikand Gūmānīk Vijār's account, all human sufferings are from the Ahriman, and Ormazd is only the creator of good deeds, and he created man to destroy him in a joint battle with the Ahriman, and purify the world once again, and end the sufferings of human beings. In Zoroastrianism, Ahriman has an independent origin and is the principle of all evil, none of which can be attributed to Ormazd, who, due to need to his creatures and some other features, is not an almighty creator.

In this article is discussed David Griffin critiques the view of traditional theism about the problem of evil. They believes in omnipotence of God and believe that God can eradicate evils. But because they are not genuine evils or they are effective in creating the best possible world, it does not take any action in this direction. But Griffin considers their reasons to be indefensible, irrational and incompatible. Because their theory require that first: God be responsible for all the evils and suffering in the world, that contradicts the attribute of God's benevolence. Secondly; it lead to the denial of the genuine evils. While every human being with common sense accepts at least the reality of some of them (evils). Even thought they are literally denied. Griffin's view on justifying the evil of the world is that God is not omnipotent. Because all entities both big and tiny have inherent power by which they resist and persist against the power and action of God and God can not defeat the evils created them of course. God's is simply to persuade beings not coerce them indirection of desired goals.

Weltschmerz by Ferdrick C. Beiser, is a study of the pessimism that dominated German philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century. According to the author, Pessimism, broadly defined, is the doctrine that life is not worth living. This view was introduced into German philosophy by Schopenhauer, whose philosophy became very fashionable in the 1860s. Beiser examines the intense and long controversy that arose from Schopenhauer's pessimism, which changed the agenda of philosophy in Germany away from the logic of the sciences and toward an examination of the value of life. He examines the major defenders of pessimism (Philipp Mainländer, Eduard von Hartmann and Julius Bahnsen) and its chief critic, especially Eugen Dühring. In this paper, I introduce the book’s general approach, aim and contents, mentioning its privileges as a history of philosophy of an almost forgotten controversy and some wishes about its shortcomings.

By introducing evidential argument, William Rowe opened a new chapter in discussions about problem of evil. Rowe’s first formulation of the problem based on the idea that because “it appears” that some evils in the world are gratuitous then they are indeed so. The most influential critique of Rowe’s argument is Stephen Wykstra’sthat is based on the epistemological principle which is called CORNEA. He shows that in the Rowe’s assumed situation we are not permitted to pass from “it appears” to “is”. According to CORNEA,considering evidence Xwe areentitled to say it appears that p, only if p were not the case, probably X was different in a discernable way. The goal of this paper is firstly to introduce CORNEA as an answer to the problem of gratuitous evil, then introduce and assesse some selected critiques ofCORNEA and to defencethe principle and finally compare between skeptical theism - that CORNEA is an instance of – and approaches of Islamic thinkers to the problem of evil.