mohammad keivanfar

Kindī is a philosopher who did not present a coherent conception of God. The God he portrays sometimes resembles the God of the Quran, at other times the God of the Mu'tazilites, and occasionally the God of Neoplatonists. These varying interpretations have led to diverse perspectives in his surviving works regarding the emergence of beings. Some commentators attribute the theory of emanation (al-ṣudūr) to al-Kindī, while others emphasize the theory of creation ex nihilo (creation from nothing). The main objective of this article is to examine al-Kindī’s views and those of his significant commentators on the theories of emanation and creation ex nihilo. The data collection method is library-based, and the data analysis method is descriptive-analytical. The article’s rough conclusion is that al-Kindī, by distinguishing between fiʿl (action) and ʿamal (deed), argues that God, or the "True First Agent," possesses perfect action (fiʿl), while metaphorical agents (fāʿils bi-l-majāz) perform deeds (ʿamal). This distinction allows creation ex nihilo to be understood as God’s action, while emanation is viewed as the deed of metaphorical agents. With this perspective, it can be argued that al-Kindī reconciles the theory of emanation with the theory of creation ex nihilo.

The definition of mystical experience and religious experience, as well as the relationship between them, has always been one of the issues discussed by religious and mystical researchers. Due to the diversity of so-called mystical and religious experiences and also due to the ambiguity in the two terms "religion" and "mysticism", we are faced with various definitions of these experiences and it is difficult to propose a consensus definition.One of the proponents in this field is Jerome Gellman, a contemporary philosopher of religion and researcher of mysticism. With an innovative design, Gellman divides mystical and religious experiences into four categories: general mystical experience, specific mystical experience, general religious experience, and specific religious experience. He defines each of these terms separately and mentions specific examples for each to make them clearer. In this article, we will first quote his point of view and then examine and evaluate it. In our opinion, although Gellman's innovative view has positive aspects, it is ultimately a proposed definition that is neither comprehensive nor able to solve the problems in the special field completely he is interested in i.e. philosophy.

Mohibullah Allahabadi is one of the elders of the Chishtiyya dynasty in India and one of the staunch defenders of Ibn Arabi and the idea of unity of Being. This article examines the features of Allahabadi's Farsi commentary (manuscript). The article tries to show the quality and position of Allahabadi's commentary among the different commentaries of Fusus by dividing the features into two categories: formal (method) and content, focusing on the content. The main focus of the article will be on Allahabadi's mild criticisms of Ibn Arabi as well as his criticisms of Qeisari and other commentators. The result is that, despite Allahabadi's meticulousness, which shows his independent character and mastery of the text, except for a few cases of mostly favorable differences in the interpretation of Quranic verses, most of his few criticisms towards Ibn Arabi are in the field of vocabulary and phrasing. His objections to Qeisari are also limited to the literal interpretation of the text of Fusus and never leave the framework of thinking that governs theoretical mysticism, of which Qeisari's works are considered one of the most important aspects. However, among the few Persian commentaries of Fusus, Allahabadi's commentary is the most independent commentary on Fusus compared to Qeisari's, and in general, the "added value" of Allahabadi's commentary can be seen in his accurate translation of Fusus into Persian, which is of course far from contemporary Persian.

Ibn Arabi deals with "heart wisdom" in the Shuayb chapter of Fusus al-Hakam. His discussion has different aspects of ontology, anthropology, epistemology, etc., but the his main word is epistemological claims about mystical intuition and theoretical reason. He believes that mystical intuition has the characteristic of epistemic comprehensiveness and can lead us to the truth, but rational knowledge does not have access to the truth of things due to the narrowness of this type of knowledge. It is because of this feature that people always disagree with each other. This article, after a detailed description of Ibn Arabi's point of view, concludes whether Ibn Arabi's current account of this discussion can be considered as an argument in favor of the epistemological validity of mystical intuitions. The authors believe that his discussion can not be considered as an epistemological argument in defense of the validity of intuition, but it is an explanation of intuitive and rational knowledge in the framework of ontology accepted by Ibn Arabi.

In the field of epistemology, "constructivism" is basically a post-Kantian view as opposed to the traditional view of representationalism. There are different types of epistemological constructivism, but what they have in common is that knowledge is like a commodity made in part or in full by the cognitive agent, and it is not in accordance with the view of representationalists who believe that the cognitive agent's mind merely acts as a mirror and narrator for independent reality outside the mind. The idea of ​​constructivism has also spread to the realm of mystical experience / revelation. Constructivists, in contrast to essentialists, believe that mystical experience / revelation is formed within the framework of the previous conceptual construction of the mind of an individual who had already mystical experience / revelation. In this article, it is examined that a kind of constructivism is seen in the thought of Sadr al-Din Ghunawi, which can be called "nominal constructivism". Defending the validity of intuitive knowledge called ghorbi (proximity) or fanayi (annihilation), Ghunawi emphasizes the role of the noun governing the cognitive agent in the construction of rational knowledge as well as bound intuitive knowledge, although he excludes proximity intuition from the scope of this constructivism. Accordingly, it can be said that Ghunawi believes in a kind of limited or partial constructivism. Finally, in the view of the authors, this kind of constructivism is neither defensible, nor does it fulfill Ghunawi's ultimate goal in defending intuitive knowledge.

Alvin Plantinga, on the relationship between science and religion, has two general approaches: defensive and aggressive. In the first approach, he tries to show that there is no deep-seated conflict between science and religion. But in the second approach, it seeks to show that, contrary to popular opinion, there is a profound conflict between science and naturalism. He puts forward an argument called "evolutionary argument against naturalism." The main idea of his argument is that the probability of the reliability of the cognitive capacity of man with the acceptance of the combination of naturalism and the theory of evolution is low, and this includes all beliefs produced by the cognitive capacity of man, including the very belief in naturalism. Therefore, the simultaneous acceptance of naturalism and the theory of evolution is not reasonable , While this problem does not exist in the simultaneous acceptance of theism and evolutionary theory. Plantinga's argument has come up with many reactions and criticisms. Ernest Sosa has written two criticisms. By referring to Descartes and distinguishing between non-reflective and reflectivel knowledge; By referring to Descartes and distinguishing between non-formal and informal knowledge, he considers Plantinga to be essentially concerned with reflective knowledge and considers it to be incorrect; in Sosa's view, the status of theism and naturalism is the same. Plantinga, on the other hand, sees the main problem in reflctive knowledge, and believes that theism is better than naturalism, because naturalism is confronted with a defeater.

In present paper, first the concept of informal economy and its place in the economic literature has been described. Then the causes and factors involved in providing the informal sector was examined and the volume of informal economy was estimated. Second, the effect of inflation on informal economy was surveyed. To estimate the volume of informal sector, Residual discrepancy method was used and the volume of informal economy in urban areas in Iran economy from 1982/83 to 2008/09 was calculated. The results show the increasing trend of informal sector volume, during the imposed Iraq-Iran war. In addition, after the imposed war some fluctuation in the hidden economy has been detected. In the final part, after studying existing stationary of the used variables, the effect of inflation rate (in special groups) on the informal sector was examined by using OLS method. The results show that urban informal sector increase, if only inflation rate in the goods group grow up.

Privatization is a process in which the ownership of governmental economic enterprises is transferred to private sector. According to other countries’ experiences and discussed economic theories over the past decades, privatization has improved the performance of companies and economic enterprises. In this study, financial ratios of companies were used as their performance indicators. This paper studies the function of companies that were assigned to private sector in Iran, before and after assignment. Results show that performance indicators of companies that transferred to private sector through stock exchange did not improve during the two following years after that.