جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « حافظه » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Sensational perception, reason, testimony and introspection are the fundamental sources of knowledge. It has been much debated that memory is one of the basic sources of knowledge. This article aims to apply the perspective of Frise and Allameh Tabatabai about the epistemological status of memory with an analytical approach. In this essay, we try to answer the questions raised such as, is the memory one of the sources of belief production? Do memory beliefs justify other beliefs? Are memory beliefs self-justified or do they need justification? This article shows that by relying on the epistemological function of memory, Frise considered it as a source of belief production, by which those beliefs can be used in the structure of reasoning. While unifying memory and imagination, relying on the reductionist approach of powers, Allameh Tabatabi has considered imagination as the source of partial beliefs, so that it performs this action with the cooperation of common sense and communication with the outside world. Both philosophers believe that memory is just like a repository whose epistemological status is meaningful in preserving the justified beliefs. Also, from the view point of Frise and Allameh Tabatabai, memory beliefs are among self-justified and basic beliefs that are used to justify non-memory beliefs. Therefore, the view point of these two thinkers can be closed to the reformed foundationalism approach.

Epistemology, which deals with the possibility, whatness, sources, and realm of knowledge, bases one of its most important principles on discovering Man’s sources of knowledge. Contemporary epistemologists refer to five sources of knowledge for human beings: sense perception, reason, introspection, testimony, and memory. Descartes, as a philosopher of the Western world, and Mullā Ṣadrā, as a philosopher of the world of Islam, have provided some theories regarding the problem of knowledge, particularly its sources. Their views are compatible with the pentagonal model proposed by cotemporary epistemologist in this respect. Mullā Ṣadrā and Descartes believe that knowledge acquisition begins with sense perception and ends in reason. Nevertheless, the difference is that, although reason in the Transcendent Philosophy is the last level of perception, it does not mark the end of the way, and it is intuition-based introspection that ends the acquisition of true knowledge. In the cognitive schools of Mullā Ṣadrā and Descartes, sense perception, intellect, and introspection are responsible for producing knowledge, testifying to its transfer, and functioning as social and general sources of knowledge, and memory is responsible for maintaining and safekeeping of knowledge.

The problem of personal identity, i.e. the question of what a person's being a person is based on, is one of the problems with a long history in philosophy and theology. The most important topic in the debates about personal identity is the criteria based on which a person remains the same person over time and is different from others. Personal identity is related to issues such as soul-body relation, memory, the whatness of "I", evidence of identity recognition, and even human population. It goes without saying that the personal identity is one of the topics that can have a special relevance in the survival of the soul and immortality. In his book Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality (1978), John Perry tries to present various philosophical positions and views on personal identity and immortality in the form of a three-person conversation between three fictional characters. In this book, various issues such as survival after death, the role of memory in personal identity, and the relationship of the body with the soul have been discussed from different perspectives. In this article, we will first introduce John Perry and his works. Then we examine the content of the book and the weaknesses of the arguments. At the end, we will have a look at the general quality of the Persian translation of the book (translated by Kaveh Lajevardi, published by Markaz Publications) and suggest what we think are better translations for some of the sentences.

One of the important problems that has remained untouched in Sadrian philosophy is the incremental fourth dimension. The basis of the incremental view of time is the non-existent future, while the past and present have their fixed places. Muslim philosophers have not directly addressed this idea; however, it seems to be necessary for demonstrating some statements of Sadrian philosophers about the immateriality of sensory and imaginal perceptions and memory. When we perceive something using our senses or imagination, the perception remains in our mind exactly in the same way that it had appeared. This paper is intended to illustrate that this view is, in fact, unrelated to immateriality and, in the case of admissibility of its arguments, can only prove the incremental fourth dimension. In line with this approach, the author has critically examined the literature of this dimension in pre-Sadrian philosophers, particularly Suhrawardī’s claim as to attributing the idea of the incremental fourth dimension to some thinkers. Suhrawardī maintains that, as each of the motions has come into existence, all motions have come into existence, and they share the feature of being in existence with each other.

Ṣadrīan philosophy holds that all kinds of memory, as well as all kinds of perception (sensory, imaginary, or rational/intellectual), are non-material. On this account, perceptual forms are identically retained. They remain in the core of our souls and never go out of existence. Remembrance or recollection is to give attention to and recognize the very same initial forms. In this way, when it comes to memory, Ṣadrīan philosophy fundamentally diverges from its predecessors as well as modern sciences. Because, these modern sciences do not see the need to assume the immateriality of memory. They often suggest that information is stored in the material brain through a kind of encoding, attributing the constancy of memory to the constancy of genetic and neuronal encoding. In this article, I adjudicate these opposing views. To do so, I overview arguments presented for the immateriality of memory both in Ṣadrā’s own works and those of his commentators. I then show that, pace Ṣadrīan philosophy, materialism about memory is more plausible than the immateriality view. I propose a simple materialistic explanation as an alternative—i.e. an explanation in terms of a distinction between the epistemic mind and the non-epistemic brain memory—to criticize Ṣadrīan arguments and unveil their fallacies.

In this research, I analyze and then appraise the relevant views by drawing on a philosophical method and logical tools. On occasion, we cite the achievements of modern sciences as well.

For Ṣadrā, sensory and imaginary perceptions are immaterial. These immaterial forms are identically retained in memory, and then the same identical immaterial forms are recollected. In his discussion of the “traversing movement” (al-ḥarakat al-qaṭʿiyyah), he makes it explicit that the mind, unlike the changing physical external world, has the following characteristic: whatever occurs moment by moment in it remains the same and in an instantaneous, rather than gradual, way. Ṣadrīans hold that when, say, a lunar eclipse happens, a form is present to me, and when the eclipse ends, another epistemic form is created in me, while the first form still remains in my mind. In this way, the initial form does not go away, but rather a new form is added. Another argument presented by Ṣadrīans is that, when dying, people “instantaneously” remember everything they perceived throughout their lives. Moreover, memory is characteristically recognitional; that is, it involves the recognition that the remembered thing is identical to what was initially perceived. However, “identity” is incompatible with the materiality of memory. Changes in the brain also demonstrate that memory is not material: brains and their nerves change with all of their material contents, while psychological memories remain in the mind after years.I think all of these arguments are objectionable. Suffice to say, Peripatetic philosophers believe that sensory and imaginary mental forms are material, and then assume that no mental form goes away, but remains in its own realm. Such constancy does not necessarily have to do with immateriality, since such constancy of the material is conceived in modern philosophy and physics in terms of the growing block view of time.In critique of therecognition argument for the immateriality of memory, for example, we might say that it proves too much: The basis of this argument is the very paradox of Meno, which challenges not only the memory but also any kind of knowledge.Similarly, the identity argument proves too much and therefore it is objectionable in that if identity could show the immateriality of memory, it could establish the immateriality of the material world as well. For instance, the mountain I see today is identicalto the one Isaw yesterday. So, these are identical, without the mountain being immaterial. Since identity does not imply immateriality in these cases, it does not imply the immateriality of memory either.In response to the argument from brain change, we might say that, before their destruction, brain cells transmit their physical information to the young cells, which in turn transmit the information to other cells before they die. As an analogy, suppose that an audio tape lasts for twenty years, but before it expires, we record its content on another brand-new tape, which retains the same audio.In addition, since Ṣadrīans believe that the retained perceptual forms are directly present to us, they must say that we have knowledge-by-presence of them, albeit unconsciously. The idea of unconscious knowledge sounds implausible to me.To establish the immateriality of memory and imaginative forms, Ṣadrā also tries to undermine the material account of memory. He argues that the many forms we have perceived in our lives cannot be imprinted in our finite, and even small, material brains. However, this seems unlikely only for Ṣadrā while it is not impossible by itself. It simply can be explained away by modern science:it has been established today that a large amount of information can be stored in very small memory cards.A major objection I raised against the Ṣadrīan view is that errors in memory are incompatible with its immateriality and with being remembrance a matter of knowledge by presence. For just as sensory perceptions cannot be kinds of knowledge by presence because they involve errors, remembrance cannot be a kind of such knowledge because of errors it involves.Moreover, I argue that not only Ṣadrā’s commentators, but also Ṣadrā himself, failed to stay committed to the consequences of the immateriality of memory, as he sometimes says, and rightly so, that memories are destructible. This is an obvious endorsement of changes in such perceptual forms, which imply their materiality and inconstancy.

Pre-Ṣadrīan philosophies as well as the prevalent scientific view present a far more plausible account of memory and how sensory and imaginative forms are retained than the Ṣadrīan constancy and immateriality account. Alternative materialistic explanations and the objection from errors in memory, as well as a host of other reasons, call Ṣadrīan arguments into question, including the sudden survival of movement, instantaneous detailed recollection of all forgotten memories in abnormal states or under unusual pressures, conceiving particular meanings as they were initially perceived by some old and sick people without any distortions, recognition and identity, and constancy of memory despite changes in brain cells.

Some objections to the mental existence that are proposed by the western philosophers are almost unknown to Muslim philosophers and therefore have not received flawless response yet. For example, the complicated formulae objection, being one of the most important and difficult of them, says that since no man can imagine the complicated things, they cannot be in our minds. The mental existence difficulties arising from the complicated things are of several kinds. Sometimes we must remember a complicated thing by means of memory and imagine it in our minds. Sometimes too we must first imagine a complicated argument, that is so long, in our minds to then have logical certainty about it. And sometimes too a complicated argument is so long that no ordinary man can imagine its details in his entire life and therefore it is only of computer-assisted proof. We will investigate here the very three kinds – that are connected with memory – and will try to analyze them mostly based on the views of Muslim thinkers. After criticizing the actual and potential views of Muslim philosophers, we will propose our own views about the three kinds in the end. On the suitable occasions, we will response to the possible objections too.

The discussion of the soul and its powers has always been a concern of philosophers. One of these powers is the memory, in the interpretation of which Aristotle and Ibn Sina have chosen two separate paths. Ibn Sina considers memory to be the treasure trove of illusions. In contrast, Aristotle does not mention the power of illusion. Hence, he does not discuss its treasure trove and according to his explanations, he almost equates memory with imagination. In this article, we seek to examine the views of Ibn Sina and Aristotle on the function of memory to show the differences and similarities between the two philosophers. Naturally, we will also determine the extent to which Ibn Sina is affected by Aristotle on the issue of memory. The type of this study is the historiography of thought, extracting opinions from different sources, comparing and critically examining them. The conclusion is briefly that Ibn Sina was influenced by Aristotle in most matters of the soul, but his interpretation of memory differs fundamentally from that of Aristotle. In his interpretation of memory, Aristotle pays special attention to remembrance and the element of time in the formation of memory, but Ibn Sina does not mention the role of time and remembrance.

As for the mind and body, Russell first acknowledges the existence of the universe, and, regardless of the sensory and visual data from objects on the mind, accepts the independent objectivity of the nature of things. But then, by considering this objectivity as non- factual and reducing it to what has given by senses and by the direct experience of the soul, interpreted the objective things differently and seek to bring the object and the mind closer together. Eventually, he reduced mental matters to the physical affairs, and accepts the union of e mind and the brain. Martyr Motahhari, on the other hand, by accepting the abstraction of the soul by reciting Sadr al-Muta'allehin, accepts the effortful unity of the soul, which includes the soul and the body, and rejects any interpretation of perception and memory based on physicalism. In his view, the body and its parts are the perceptual tools  that is performed by the soul. As a result, by adopting the foundations of Islamic philosophy, which were first expressed by Mulla Sadra and represented in Motahhari's works, one can critique Russell's physiological foundations in this regard.

Every possible existence in the system of divine creation requires two things: one, the agent who creates and the other, the goal to move towards it. Basically, the requirement of a causality system is nothing but this. Moving towards the goal, regardless of the type of beings, is an inherent feature of every possible existence. Based on the refusal of sequence in the circle of causes, this end eventually leads to an end that no longer has an end, and that goal is the duty of the obligatory existence. Animals are no exception to this rule because of their potential. According to the verses of the Qur'an and the hadiths of the Imams, this matter has been expressed in various ways. This return to the final end, which is interpreted as "resurrection", is divided into two species in the case of animals according to their nature. Either we encounter animals in the world that have imagination and memory, that their resurrection takes place independently, or animals that are only in the level of sense and do not rise above it, that they do not have an independent return, and that they return only to their Lord of types.

Using an explanatory-critical approach, this paper studies the criterion of personal identity including memory, continuity and mental continuity. This criterion has different interpretations. Some consider personal identity to be the sum of memories called memory, but others see psychological continuity along with physical continuity, such as the brain, as the criterion for personal identity. In general, these opinions have several disadvantages, memory is an accidental entity, while personal identity cannot be considered as an accidental entity, On the other hand, by damaging the brain, all or part of the memory will be lost. Therefore, psychological continuity along with physical continuity cannot be a criterion of personal identity. This criterion cannot answer to issues such as life after death, moral responsibility and legal punishments.

In this paper, we look at the epistemological role of memory in aanalytical view. Among the sources of knowledge and justification, one can refer to sensory perception, introspection, testimony, reasoning, and deduction. There is a lot of debate about whether memory is a basic source of knowledge or not. There has long been proponents and opponents for this issue. Thus, in this article, we try to answer the following questions: Is memory part of epistemic resources? If we consider memory as a resource of knowledge, can it independently be a source of knowledge? Or is it merely a source of protection and preservation? In this essay, we first briefly consider the metaphysics of memory, and then we look at the epistemological role and its place in epistemology. This paper shows that memory is not only productive, but also does not seem to play a role in Preservationism. Nevertheless, conservationist theory seems more acceptable than other competing theories.

Religious beliefs form a part of religion and are depended on rational and narrative proofs. Every given spot in epistemic sources of narration would lead to the authenticity of narration. It is, therefore, necessary to study the knowledge-carrying fundamentals of narrative proofs and the views in the field. This research uses a descriptive-analytical method to achieve the purpose. Supporting non reductionist approach of evidence is the most important achievement of this research. According to this approach, the evidence is an independent source of knowledge and may produce knowledge for those learning to make their beliefs reasonable. The narrative proofs pertaining to the pure`s saying deed and confirmation is the most significant and prominent case of the testimony. Therefore, we can emphasize the knowledge-carrying state of the narrative proofs. Even according to the reductionist approach and the denial of knowledge-carrying state of the evidence, one may prove the authenticity of the proof of the validity of the narrative evidence, that in the case, the evidence is merely a carrier of the knowledge derived from revelation and sense which their authenticity has been proved in epistemology.

Memory is a potency which makes man to be able to fix and to deposit those data which are being grasped through senses, and to use them whenever are needed. That is why our data remain unchanged and we can clearly remember our past. For Mulla Sadra the memory is unchanged because it is an abstract entity. Based upon his theory, all corporeal entities are constantly moving. Therefore if the memory is corporeal, it has to be subject to the change. But neuroscientists do not consider all motions as change. So for them the motions at the level of subatomic or atomic world do not make any change in the biological world. Even if it is considered to be a change by transcendent theosophy, but for neuroscientists only those changes at the level of neuron sells can change the memory, thus they attribute the fixity of the memory to the fixity of coding the genes and accordingly coding the neurons, and if any kind of confusion occurs in this function, we will lose our memory. Therefore for them the memory is corporeal, and in spite of being so, in normal conditions no change occurs in its deposited data. Thus to prove the abstractness of the memory we have to utilize other reasons.

The refuting of private language is one of the important ideas of later Wittgenstein; a language whose words are only known for its user. To justify impossibility of the private language، Wittgenstein in his diary argument shows that it is impossible for a person to name one of his own sensations by using a sign like “S” and to write it in his diary and then he cannot register its repetition in his diary. There are many interpretations of this argument. Some consider it as an argument against the validity of memory and some others consider it as an emphasis on the necessity of rules for using the words in a language. Skepticism in the validity of memory sometime is related to the ability of memory in keeping the first sensation and sometime is related to the ability of memory in correct remembering of using of a sign in the past. The commentators mostly accepted the first part and according to their view، since there is no objective criterion for assessment of use of a sign، the possibility of assessing the correctness of memory function in private language is denied. In this article، some interpretations of diarist argument are investigated.

“Sources of knowledge” is one of the significant topics in contemporary epistemology. Epistemologists accept five sources of knowledge: perception، reason، introspection، testimony، and memory. This paper compares introspection، testimony and memory in Mulla Sadra and Descartes’ philosophical systems. The two philosophers accept introspection، testimony and memory as the sources of knowledge. Both consider the knowledge derived from introspection as certain. They consider testimony as Transferor and memory as maintainer.

Henry Bergson, the French philosopher, is one of pioneers of though stream which in the course of modern positivist views, renewed the role and authenticity of metaphysical, ethical and religious ideas. By adopting the intuitive epistemic method instead of experimental and positivistic method of modern science, he gave a central role to these ideas. He considered any kind of analytic view to the objects of knowledge asignoring their essential interconnections and so inversion of their nature. According to Bergson, the world and all of its phenomena are temporal and dynamic. He means by time a kind of continuity and sequence of correlating phenomena and calls it "during." In his point of view, understanding of this essential nature is only possible by intuitivemethod and immediate connection to the world and its phenomena. The most sensible instance of this understanding is the conscience which we have from our inner states.Bergson uses his epistemological point of view in explaining the relation of mind and body. He accepts the duality of mind and body and considers the analysis of perceptual behavior as an explanation of their relation. According to him, knowledge has two aspects: sensitiveimpressions and memory which joint in the point of "image-souvenir." This point converts sensitive impression to the epistemic stream. However, it seems that Bergson's analysis has no substantive difference from Descarte's pineal gland and in effect, does not solve the problem of duality of mind and body and their relation to each other, since heconsiders the duality of mind and body as ontological and not epistemological as well.

This paper tries to study the question of whether the notion ofcollective unconscious as developed by Jung has any neural correlates.Also, the notion will be pinned down with respect to the realm ofcognitive science as well as the interpretation of modern cognitivepsychologists. For example, it will be shown that unconscious humanemotions somehow are related to the long term memory which hasgenetic base in psychology and is based on the changes in genotypestructure. With reference to the ideas projected by people such asRoederer, Panksepp, and McLennan, it will be clarified that why innatural dreams and imaginations, there are always fixed backgrounds,called archetypes by Jung. The claim, then, is that archetypes have todo with brain structure, neurons, and genetics of the brain structure.