جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Plantinga » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

This paper has two objectives first, to provide an explanation and analysis of Anselm and Plantinga's ontological argument based on the interpretation of William Rowe, a contemporary atheist, and second, to determine the place of the fallacy of " begging the question" in this argument. After presenting the criticisms of Anselm's interpretation of the argument, Rowe considers Plantinga's modal version to be the most convincing version of the argument and believes that previous interpretations, based on the principle that "existence in reality" is a superior property, are caught in a logical fallacy. Plantinga's interpretation is also based on the premise that God is "a possible being with maximum perfection," and this proposition is true only if God exists in the real world. In this research, using an analytical-critical method, I show that Anselm's interpretation and Plantinga's reconstruction of it are fallacious, and although Plantinga's modal interpretation has logical necessity, it does not prove the necessity of God's existence in the external world. This is because perfection in this argument is defined in a way that falls into the fallacy of "begging the question”.

In the symmetry problem of evil, the multiplicity and intensity of evil are used as evidence against the existence of God. According to this, there are terrible evils in the world that an all-knowing, omnipotent and pure good being could prevent, without losing a greater good or allowing a greater or equal evil, but he did not do so; So, the greater the severity and diversity of this evil, the less the possibility of the existence of a pure good God who is all-knowing and Omnipotent. Michael Tolley believes in the problem of symmetry of evil. He believes in the improbability of God's existence by relying on premises such as the plurality of evil, examining the possibilities of the theory of God's existence in comparison with alternative theories, and citing the Lisbon earthquake as the main argument. On the other hand, Alvin Plantinga, in response to Tully, relying on premises such as that theism is the most probable option, because its alternative theories have serious problems, by criticizing two of the premises of Tully's main argument, seeks to prove the existence of God. In this article, an attempt has been made to explain Tully and Plantinga's argument by relying on the library method and then presenting other criticisms of Tully's probability theory.

Moral and natural accidents and misfortunes are part of the evil that we face in our surroundings. The problem of this research with the descriptive-analytical method and library-based collection, is a comparative study of the intellectual opinions of two Muslim and Christian thinkers (Ayatollah Javadi Amoli and Plantinga) and the connection between the subject of evil and Divine Science, Power and Wisdom from their views. Ayatollah Javadi has analyzed evil as nonexistent, and in addition, has used the theory of the best system, nizami ahsan, and relativizing the evil to solve the doubt. Plantinga, however, seeks help from a logical method known as the "defense based on authority". The answer on possible worlds is also discussed with this theory. The research findings show that the thinkers share the belief in the absolute perfect God. Of course, Ayatollah Javadi's point of view answers the question of moral and natural evil, but Plantinga's answer refers to mere moral evil and indirectly answers the question of natural evil.

Plantinga is one of the virtue-oriented philosophers and in epistemology, he has an approach of reliability and extroversion, in virtue-based reliability, the virtue and vice characteristics of the knowing agent, including the characteristics and aptitude of epistemological powers, are emphasized for Modi on the truth of belief. In general epistemology, Plantinga presented the theory of guarantee in the mechanism of the correct functioning of powers, and to guarantee the four conditions of the contract, which are: correctness of cognitive powers, correctness of work and suitable environment, purpose and plan, in religious epistemology, Plantinga considers humans to have a divine sense that Under the right circumstances, an actualized sense of theology produces honest religious beliefs. According to Mullah Sadra, the perceptive powers and the characteristics of the cognitive subject are effective in the formation of beliefs. With the condition of virtue of the perceptive powers regarding religious propositions, he distinguishes the powers that generate sincere religious beliefs from other powers. are, with the two processes of revelation and inspiration, the originator of honest religious belief, knowing the infallibility of honest beliefs resulting from the power of sanctity and recognizing the powers of perception of religious propositions as inherent, the wideness of honest religious beliefs and the influence of non-cognitive factors affecting knowledge and the role of moral virtues in Knowledge is one of the reasons for the similarity of Mulla Sadra's view to Plantinga.

The purpose of this article was to examine one of the important views in the analysis of knowledge, that is, Plantinga's new view, called proper functionalism. This research was carried out with a descriptive-analytical-critical method through collecting information, studying written works and analyzing concepts, propositions and arguments. The findings of the research showed that the former views (both internalism and externalism) cannot guarantee the truth of a belief due to ignoring the proper functioning of cognitive powers as a necessary condition for knowledge. But Plantinga's view, in addition to proper function, includes other elements such as a good design map and a suitable cognitive environment. Of course, Plantinga's view has not been without criticism. The most important criticisms that have been raised against his view are "swamp man" and "problem of accuracy". And in this article, the inadequacy of the previous views was shown and also the elements and principles of Plantinga's view were explained. And then, "swamp man" and "problem of accuracy" were examined. Plantinga, faced with the problem of accuracy, presented different interpretations of proper functionalism. Examining the problems and answers of the parties showed that Plantinga's final analysis is defensible in the face of these two criticisms.

The current study examines Plantinga's anti-evidentialist position through the perspective of applied philosophy of religion, illustrating how epistemological positions can have detrimental practical effects. The article's main claim is that entering the postmodern era and distancing thinkers like Plantinga from general rationality and lowering its standards, including the duty to ground claims on sufficient evidence, has eventually caused reason to be excluded from religious dialogue or to talk about a kind of regional rationality. The consequence of this transformation is the obstruction of dialogue between followers of various religions on the one hand, and believers and non-believers on the other, and lastly, the deprivation of human beings of common and agreed-upon criteria for criticizing each other's beliefs. When the issue of obstruction of dialogue and critique is combined with the fact that there is a close link between beliefs and actions, the problem becomes even worse; because without general criteria for criticizing beliefs, it will be impossible to criticize the actions resulting from them, and all groups, including extremist groups, will be able to absolve themselves of responsibility for their actions and justify their possible crimes in practice.

This article is an effort to show that during the history of philosophy – both in the epistemology and ethics domains – evidentialism based on extreme rationalism has tremendously influenced the true mechanism of the formation of faith in God. In the light of a kind of determinism, it has averted attentions from the role of other functions such as emotions, passions, and especially volition in the formation of faith in theists within the common understanding framework. Among the contemporary thinkers, William James and Plantinga have tried to modify this deterministic approach and revive those practical aspects of the formation of faith that are always forgotten. The salient common point in the theories of these two thinkers are the attention to the practical aspects of faith within the common understanding framework and the emphasis on the significant role of volition – in line with reason – in the formation of faith. This way, it can be observed that the opinions of William James and Plantinga about the way the mechanism of faith in God is formed complete each other.

Patrick Grim has presented an argument against the compatibility of Divine Omniscience. Citing Cantor's Theorem and using the accepted definition of omniscience -knowledge of all true propositions- Grim denies the existence of an Omniscient due to the impossibility of a set that includes all true propositions. Grim's argument raised many answers by Christian philosophers. For example, Plantinga has objected to this argument by showing its self-contradictoriness. Although there are fundamental differences between Islamic and Christian theology in explaining the nature of omniscience, considering the capacity of Sadra's transcendent wisdom, by citing issues such as the definition and nature of collection as well as the conditions of impossible sequence, addition to refuting Grim's argument that there are more facts than the set of all facts, the possibility of the knowledge of Omniscient to an infinite series of sets of facts can be proved.

Wittgenstein with a linguistic view of religious beliefs, and Kierkegaard, who opposes religious propositions, are considered believers, Plantinga has an extroverted and trusting approach. In the mechanism of reaching his general epistemology, he first talks about the functioning of correct epistemological powers and guaranteed knowledge, he enters religious epistemology with these foundations. Plantinga has a virtue-oriented approach in religious epistemology. The virtue of beliefs resulting from divine sense is due to the basis and certainty of this power, reasoning based on its true basis leads us to faith. From the basis of the beliefs resulting from the divine sense, he concludes the natural knowledge of God, this knowledge is natural, reliable and guaranteed. Plantinga has removed any rational reflection from the process of producing and guaranteeing beliefs resulting from divine sense. Plantinga has also acted as a believer in his religious experience. Religious beliefs resulting from religious experience are basic and infallible beliefs, so belief in God is also accepted as a basis. Plantinga, although he does not admit to being a believer and does not accept such a claim, but his being a believer is an essential part of accepting It is his. And without believing in faith, it can be said that his religious epistemological apparatus and structure are not properly planned.

According to methodological naturalism, in scientific explanation we can only appeal to natural laws, forces and entities, without assuming any role for supernatural entities and parameters. Philosophical naturalism is an ontological view according to which there is nothing but natural elements, principles, and physical entities. To justify their views, naturalists usually use Darwin's theory of evolution and extend its domain over all phenomena. In this paper, we will explain Daniel Dennett's views on these issues and critically evaluate his arguments. Then, Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism will be discussed. The conclusion of the paper is that ontological naturalism is not a correct and tenable opinion.

This paper has been written with the aim of answering the following two questions: "Is it possible to know the God’s Essence in view of Alvin Plantinga? What are its strengths and weaknesses in this regard?" The findings of this paper are: In the Plantinga’s vocabulary network, essence and nature are used in the same sense; in view of Plantinga, God has absolute sovereignty over the universe. Plantinga has the following effects on this sovereignty: The simplicity of the Essence, the objectivity of the Essence and the Essence’s necessaries (which, of course, is accompanied by doubts from Plantinga's point of view) and the infinity of the Essence; After this, Plantinga proves the necessity of Essence or Nature for God and considers God’s Essence as the same as God’s Being. The lack of clarity in expressing the relationship between Essence and the necessity of Essence, as well as the lack of clarity in positions on his statements, is criticized. Finally, Plantinga rejects the belief that it is impossible to know Essence and accepts that man has the possibility of knowing God’s Essence; of course, there are other criticisms of his arguments, such as reducing theology to conceptual issues and presupposing the authenticity of the scriptures. This article collect data and analyze and critique them with descriptive-analytical method and uses library tools too.

Plantinga and Ayatollah Mesbah, as two theist sages, Christians and Muslims, with two different but rational approaches, have researched the issue of evil and argued against the view of the incompatibility of the existence of natural and moral evil. This issue has been investigated based on the descriptive-analytical method of library collection. According to the theory of human free will, Plantinga does not accept the claim that there is a logical contradiction between the problem of evil and the existence of God. Ayatollah Mesbah, while accepting the solutions of Muslim philosophers, such as the non-existence of the evil, the relativity of the evil, the transcendence of the evil, the domination of charity over the evil, has emphasized the goal-oriented strategy or perfection and happiness of all human actions. The findings show that although these two thinkers, in principle, believe in an absolute perfect God (omniscient, omnipotent and pure good), but differ in the method and type of confrontation with the theory of justice and Divine wisdom. At the same time, Ayatollah Mesbahchr('39')s view responds to all natural and moral evils, but Plantingachr('39')s theory responds only to moral evils.

In the naturalism and evolutionism context, the ultimate objective and function of cognitive faculties is adaptation, survival and reproduction. Our cognitive faculties are not developed to generate true beliefs, therefore, but to have adapt behavior. Alvin Planatinga is not at ease with naturalism idea. To him, the problem with naturalism is the non-existence of proper understanding on the manner by which the belief and behavior are interrelated, thus, he concludes that the reliability of cognitive faculties are founded on low naturalistic evolutionism; because any alleged argument against these faculties, first, requires reliable perceptual faculties and next, if we realize lack of reliability in these faculties we developed self-defeating belief, consequently, in both the cases naturalism face criticism. Plantiga’s criticism on naturalism view as to reliability of cognitive faculties has made some philosophers encounter problems like: 1) high probability of interrelating casual belief and behavior, 2) argument based on personal incredulity, 3) lack of distinction between reflective and non-reflective knowledge, 4) finding independent evidence for reliability as to escape self-defeating, 5) the external status of mental states and 6) the problem of circle. To the authors here, except the problem of circle, Plantiga has been able to find proper answer for the rest of five problems. The objective here is to analyze, complete, expand and criticize Plantiga’s notion in rejecting the atheistic naturalism through the ability to secure cognitive faculties to unveil consistency of the new scientific findings with religious beliefs.

As the creator and generator of episteme, God in the root of Plantinga’s epistemology theory plays such a substantial role that overshadows the knower’s position. This approach will eventually mergesintonaturalistic episteme theories. According to Plantinga, awareness and duty should be removed from cognition process to solve Gotieh’s problem. The question is, however, whether byremoving them and the knower’s will, the theory solvesthe cognitive challenges as an extrovert reliabilism and virtue system or it just gives raise to another question. The present paper is an attempt to survey God’s position in proper function theory and answer the noted question. The study was conducted through library and theoretical review. The role of awareness in the elements of “proper function,” “proper situation,” and “desire”were elaborated through comparing awareness in Plantinga, Goldman, and Soza’s theories. The results showed that leaving God with the whole responsibility of the process of episteme development and removing the knower’s awareness from the structure of proper function of episteme forces, degrades human episteme to animal episteme. The outcome of adding the element of “desire” in the development of episteme is the conversion of episteme into something random and temperament in nature. Thereby and as to the element of “proper situation,” Plantinga needs to add the knower to the process episteme development.

This paper, with a critico-comparative approach, has intended to examine Allamah Tabatabaei and Alvin Plantinga`s views on the philosophical foundations needed for proving the existence of God. The purpose lies in explaining, comparing, and surveying Allameh Tabatabaei and Alvin Plantinga`s views in the field. As Allameh Tabatabaei believes, the existence of God is self-evident, and the proofs denote solely on Its being self-evident. And as Plantinga views, there may be found a number of minor propositions not acceptable without the belief in the existence of God. It is God who introduces these partial propositions to a religious scholar of a truly basic proposition. Although Plantinga knows the existence of God as a base, he dose not know the existence of God to be eself-evident. So there is a considerable difference between the two. The claim of self-evidence of God's existence and confirming Allameh's view is extremely difficult, as Plotninga`s view will be based on induction.

The argument based on the existence of evil in the world, as an atheistic argument against the existence of God, has two versions: logical and evidential. In this article, we have merely dealt with the first version that attempts to prove a logical inconsistency in the theists’ set of beliefs. Many hold that the traditional logical problem of evil has found a definite answer through Plantinga’s free will defense. However, in recent years, John Schellenberg has claimed a new logical problem of evil. He holds that Plantinga’s free will defense would not refute this new version. In the present paper, without any concern for fully criticizing Schellenberg’s new problem of evil and without any intent for completely representing Plantinga’s free will defense, we have challenged Schellenberg’s claim about the immunity of his version to Plantinga’s free will defense. Through undermining one of the central premises of his argument, we prove that this version is also vulnerable to plantinga’s solution.

In this article the rationality of faith in Plantinga's three major works is studied – the three works in which the author, while responding to the critiques, presents his viewpoints. In this contribution, Plantinga's line of argumentation in these books is sought and then, having explained his views, they are being analyzed. Hence, first his analogical argument is criticized and then it will be discussed that there is incoherence in his critiques of the evidentialism and foundationalism. It will be mentioned also, in the end, that his idea that the belief in God needs no evidence is a kind of fideism.

Various views about the rationality/irrationality of believing in God have been suggested by western religious and secular thinners. The theory of "Basicalism" together with its similar views such as "Evidentialism", "Fideism" and"Pragmatism" is one of the epistemological views posed about the belief in God and seeks to prove its rationality. In general, based on this view, believing in God does not require any rational reasoning. Various versions of this view have been presented so far.One of its versions expressed by scholars like Swinburne, Alston and Plantinga is what is known as Experientialism. In his special exposition of Experientialism – which he refers to as "reformed epistemology" –Plantinga has had two different dictions in his works. In his early woks such as God and other Minds, "Is Belief in God Rational?", "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" and"Reformed Epistemology and Christian Apologetics", he endeavored to prove the rationality and justificationof believing in God and tried to offer certain and compelling arguments to prove the existence of God. In these works, Plantinga has adopted an internal approach toward the rationality of believing in God and regards it as a basic belief. Criticizing classic foundationalism, he sought to expand a different version of foundationalism according to which God's existence is regarded as basic for a believer. Based on this approach, Palntinga, like other proponents of foundationalism, considers the knowledgea "True Justified Belief". His view is, however, different from other foundationalists in defining the nature of the third element of knowledge. According to Plantinga's early exposition of his theory, the criteria of rationality of believing in God include the principles of classic foundationalism(such as evident to senses, evident to reason and incorrigibility) and other elements. He rejected the deductive-priori method concerning the criteria of determining basic belief and suggested an inductive- posteriori one. Based on this view, the cause behind thebasic nature of belief is an internal aspect and consequently is completely personal and relative. That means any kind of assessment of one's beliefs should be made by referring to his/her cognitional structure. Consequently, no general criterion can be determined for making a belief basic because every individual can offer a specific criterion based on his own cognitional structure which differs from others. Thus, based on this version, the only difference between Plantinga and other foundationalists is in his different view about the basic belief of the individuals. He believes that to determine the basic beliefs, first the person should make distinction between what he considers basic from non-basic ones and then he should introduce a criterion by which his belief becomes basic. Therefore, by looking at the issue from a different angle, he offered a new and more expanded version of the basic beliefs according to which the belief in God becomes quite rational. Plantinga, on the other hand, in his later works (three Warrants)emphasizes that instead of having an internal approach toward the rationality and justification; one should have an external approach and consider the believer's beliefs as warranted. This shift in Plantinga's approach stemmed from his theory about epistemological justification of which was reflected in his two impressive works entitled:Warrant: the Current Debateand Warrant and Proper Function(published in 1993). Based on the external approach, he shifts from the notion of justification to Warrant. He considers the rationality of religious belief not in being justifiable, but warranted which can be a guarantee for the rationality of believing in God. On the other hand, he changed the third element of knowledge from "justifiable" to "warranted" and defined the knowledge as "a True Warranted Belief"In this new approach, he doesnt seek to define the justification and the internal criteria of being justifiable, rather he emphasizes the Goldman's reliabilism and speaks out about the man's propercognitional system. Based on this view, if man's cognitional system works properly, he will possess epistemological rationality. In external approach, Plantinga believes that the theistic sensation is a mechanism producing faith which, if having proper condition,can cause a belief which doesnt evidently depend on other beliefs. Thus, if the person's perceiving powers work properly and they aim to catch the truth and there is no barrier, the person's belief in God can be counted as basic.

During long centuries, many philosophers have accepted strong foundationalism and have used it in their reasoning. But some contemporary philosophers like Alvin Plantnga have suggested a new theory called reformed epistemology. According to this theory, the basic propositions are not limited to number of propositions which are accepted by strong foundationalism, but rather there are many other basic propositions including the belief in God. So the result is that according to this theory, there is no need to reasoning for the existence of God and this belief is the basic belief. Alvin Plantinga refuted the strong foundationalim by three reasons. In this paper these reasons have been analyzed and criticized. And then five reasons to refute the theory of reformed epistemology have been explained. Plantinga himself have faced some of these reasons and have tried to reply them, but in this paper his reasons have been refuted and finally the theory of reformed epistemology has been rejected.

Molla Sadra and Plantinga, the former from Islamic philosophy tradition and the latter from the western tradition, each has studied the important problem of evils on his own principles and views. Relying on principality and goodness of existence, God`s attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and wisdom and the world order`s state of being the best, evil`s state of being non-existential, explaining cognitive evil, non-truthfulness of evils, superiority of goodness over evil and rejecting humanistic tendency in the field, Sadra has solved the problem. However, centering on reformed epistemology, some Christian theological and humanistic principles, describing the possible world and the relationship between human will and Divine Omnipotence, Plantinga has proved that reasonable problem of evil never contradicts the existence of God. Moreover, Plantinga has agreed that Divine omnipotence does not include J. L. Mackie; the two scholars think the same with belief in God, His being omnipotent, omniscient and goodness, though they differs in such fields as facing the problem, essential commenting and designation of the answer in the fields of ethics, nature and in defending Divine Justice, bestness of the world of existence and superiority of logical view.