majid mollayousefi

Repentance (tawbah) is one of the key concepts in Islamic mysticism and has been extensively explored in the works of numerous thinkers and Sufis. Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, in Qūt al-Qulūb, and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, in Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn, have elaborated on this concept. Al-Makkī conceptualises repentance (tawbah) as a spiritual and psychological process involving inner struggle (mujāhadah) and self-correction. He emphasises the practical and ascetic aspects of repentance (tawbah), presenting it as the first step on the path of sulūk (mystical journey). In contrast, al-Ghazālī, adopting a systematic and rational approach, divides repentance (tawbah) into three stages: knowledge (knowing sin), spiritual state (feeling remorse), and practice (decision to abandon sin). In addition to accepting al-Makkī's views, al-Ghazālī, through philosophical and psychological analyses, presents repentance (tawbah) as a path to spiritual transcendence and the purification of the heart (qalb). This study employs a comparative approach to examine the views of these two thinkers and analyses their differences and similarities. The findings suggest that al-Makkī primarily emphasises practical and ascetic sulūk, while al-Ghazālī, utilizing rational and philosophical tools, offers a more systematic approach. Ultimately, this article demonstrates that while these two thinkers share common ground regarding the importance of repentance (tawbah), their divergent approaches reflect differences in their intellectual schools of thought.

In his collection of works, Plato has two approaches regarding ethical researchThe first is approach that he took against the sophists and denies that virtue can be learned, and talks about the unity of arete against the multiplicity of arete among the sophists, does not consider everyone worthy of education and emphasizes the monopoly of education The second is approach based on believes that all people are worthy of benefiting from a virtue like Aidos and introduces its education through true teachers of virtue as a source of stability for the state and its prosperity Plato's works, the views of three thinkers including Protagoras Socrates and Plato have been raised regarding the concept of aidos In the Socratic treatise of Charmedes from the series of dialogues, the question is directly raised whether Eidos is considered a virtue or not. In the treatise of Protagoras, the issue of the learnability of the virtue of aidos is discussed it is mentionedaidos is a virtue that is not specialized like other arts, it is a virtue that everyone should benefit from, of course, on the condition that they can cultivate it by learning. deals with the social nature of aidos and its role in supporting civil order In the treatise of the President and Phaedrus, in the topic of the three-part theory of the human ego, the internalization of the feeling of shame is stated, but in none of these dialogues, a specific description of the nature of theaidos is given.

Van Deurzen, an existential psychotherapist, identifies self-reflection and self-discovery as the core components of existential therapy through her examination of its various aspects. She posits that humans, distinct from other creatures, possess a fluid and dynamic identity. This, according to her, allows individuals to determine their own existence and identity. Mulla Sadra, on the other hand, acknowledging the fluidity and dynamism of human identity, proposes that human existence extends beyond this world, encompassing multiple worlds and levels of existence, and within each world, individuals find a corresponding level of existence, so that through their own free will, humans determine their position in this system of existence. By elevating their existence to the level of rational existence, they can transform themselves into a rational world akin to the objective world. This paper aims to demonstrate, based on the views of these two thinkers on human beings’ fluid and dynamic existence, the self-determining nature of the human self, the place of self-discovery in existential therapy, and Sadra's perspective on self-discovery, that Sadra’s view can potentially serve as the foundation for an existential therapy within Iranian-Islamic culture.

The concept of the will in the philosophical apparatus of Schopenhauer can be a result of his profound thinking about the concept of the thing in itself in Kant's philosophical system; the concept, despite its prominent position in Kant's transcendental method, was not explained. Although Schopenhauer, by asking what is the truth behind this world, ties the essence and institution of every phenomenon in the world of representation, which he understood through the principle of sufficient reason and its four forms, to the concept of the will, but by passing from the scope of the world as representation and by revealing the will as things in itself and the understanding of this will through the body, successive the will in the phenomena and in the container of life (which is the fundamental characteristic of the will) have shown themselves; On the one hand, it has led to continuous striving and the birth of stable suffering, and on the other hand, to unstable pleasure, and as a result, such an attitude has revealed the partial existence of pessimism in this world, and it can be considered as a tragic and sadness of life. In the following article, an effort is made to reveal that Schopenhauer called suffering a positive and stable thing, and on the other hand, pleasure a negative and unstable thing, and in this case, can suffering be considered as a part of the precondition for achieving any kind of pleasure and how does the result of the aforementioned concepts lead to a pessimistic attitude in the world.

Man is a communicative being and the meaningfulness of his life can be explained according to his relation with himself, God, the world and other people. In Eckhart's thought, the highest level of the meaning of human life is realized in his union with divine truth. Eckhart considers selfishness to be the biggest obstacle to the union between man and God. In his opinion, overcoming selfishness is achieved through a kind of cognitive uplifting and complete understanding of man's existential poverty; in the sense that all existence is nothing and all that exists is God. He believes that achieving this stage is possible only by removing all personal attachments. In Eckhart's viewpoint, removing the dependencies or the worldly attachments brings love to the Origin (mabda‘) and this love strengthens the will to forsake other dependencies and as the will becomes stronger, the love becomes more intense to the extent that, at last, man would reach the level of complete detachment as well as union with God.

The present paper investigates the relationship between philanthropia and paideia based on the texts of classical Greece. The term “philanthropia” was first used in a play called Prometheus Bound by Aeschylus and was later used repeatedly in some of the literary and philosophical works of the Classical Greece. In this play, philanthropy has been attributed to Prometheus because he stole fire from Zeus to give it to human beings and save them from destruction. In the comedy Peace by Aristophanes, the god Hermes has been introduced as philanthropist because he makes it possible for the humankind to access peace. In Isocrates’ speech, the term philanthropist is applied to political leaders and people who posses the highest level of virtues and share such gifts as knowledge with others. Moreover, in the fourth book of Laws, Plato introduces Cronos a philanthropist because, during his reign, he tried to consolidate the pillars of culture and civilization in society. In the dialogue Euthyphro, Socrates considers himself to be a philanthropist because he shares his knowledge with others. As attested by Aristotle, philanthropia is an essential and intrinsic quality; however, it develops a knowledge-based form through paideia. On the other hand, those existents who are called philanthropists try to develop paideia and spread it in their society.

The influence of non-cognitive factors, including sin, on human knowledge has become a matter of question in epistemology in recent decades. Religious and mystical texts of different cultures throughout history have emphasized that humans' existential realms are deeply interconnected. Masnavi-ye-Ma'navi is an important text that discusses the influence of sin on human knowledge. In Rumi's view, sin affects the hereafter and also our existence and rational faculties in this world. Rumi's emphasis is on the daily sins, not the original sin. According to him, sins affect knowledge by causing a person to lose mental concentration due to the sense of guilt he or she experiences after sinning. In addition, he believes that the damage done to moral virtues after sinning affects intellectual virtues and, therefore, human knowledge. While Mawlana holds that sin is effective on all types of human knowledge, both our knowledge of Divine and non-Divine realms, his emphasis is on the effect of sin on our knowledge of God and self-knowledge.

The relationship between the soul and the body is one of the issues that received much attention with the beginning of philosophical thinking. The influence of Cartesian subjectivism on various fields, including ethics and culture, has made solving the problem of dualism a concern. In this article, by comparative and descriptive-analytical method, it is specified that Ṣadrā and Heidegger, in a similar approach, consider human a being, a subject that, in their opinion, has been neglected. Although the two philosophers use different terms, they are of the opinion that the distinction between the soul and the body is a rational and abstract matter, and that human beings have their own existential characteristics. Ṣadrā believes that the soul is ensued from the body and is aligned with it; and although it has its own characteristics as an abstract thing, this does not mean that there are two independent beings and that there is no more than one being ontologically. Therefore, the multiplicity of this being as the soul and body is by the credit of reason, and these aspects are not existential matters. Heidegger also believes that man is unique in his lived experience. In his view, any other conception of lived experience is a subset of it and the product of intellectual abstraction, rather than an existential matter. In his view, the Cartesian distinction causes the subjectivist aspect of man to prevail in philosophy, and under this rubric, the specific existence of man as Dasein is forgotten.

By giving a new definition of Aristotle’s φυσις and Ψυχη Heidegger criticizes science and scientism. Through these interpretations and criticisms, we can infer his opinions about consciousness. Heidegger translates φυσις as “Being itself” and maintains that it is expressed by μορφη that demonstrate a change in the spectrum. The μορφη, indeed, is the consciousness, which is also referred to as lived experience by Heidegger. It has different layers namely behavioral-perceptional, social, and pre-personal layers. He argues that by objectifying experiences, science eliminates the non-objective aspect of lived experience. It is not possible for science to study lived experience. Therefore, a science of the consciousness about the nature of consciousness is not attainable; because, consciousness is no longer consciousness when it becomes the subject of scientific examination. Heidegger rents different terms to interpret consciousness such as μορφη, truth, λόγος, and categories. He argues that consciousness in all these terms includes a duality that its relationship with an external affair is preserved. It appears that consciousness, φυσις and Being are intertwined in Heidegger’s viewpoint. He emphasizes that consciousness is man or Dassin’s connection with the external world and whatever inferred from this connection, including science, is of second order.

 In Plato’s Sophist, Heidegger interprets Book VI of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, particularly the discussion of Phronesis. In this book, he deals with five modes of Dasein’s opening, i.e. Episteme, Techne, Sophia, Nous and Phronesis. He has considered “Episteme and Sophia” to be a type of epistemic mode and “Phronesis and Techne” to be a type of calculative mode of Dasein’s soul. In fact, Heidegger introduces Aristotle’s five rational virtues as the modes of opening in Dasein. He has described Sophia as the highest type of the epistemic mode and Phronesis as the highest type of the calculative mode. It needs to be mentioned that Heidegger finally introduces Phronesis as the highest mode of Dasein’s opening. On the other hand, in Sein und Zeit, in the discussion of Dasein and particularly Dasein’s relations with other Daseins, one can understand Phronesis as a mode of Dasein’s existence. In fact, Dasein’s existential mode of being is its Phronetic existence. It is noteworthy that Heidegger in Plato’s Sophist presents the same interpretation of Phronesis that one finds in Sein und Zeit. Indeed, to express Phronesis, Heidegger refers to Dasein’s existential mode of being and finally he has fathomed the genuine mode of behavior as something in practice that lies in the call of conscience; this is what Heidegger presents as the forgotten conscience in Plato’s Sophist

The human shawl and the existential texture of the human body develops on the basis of the personality and temperament of the parent, and many of his or her temperament are formed from their inherited substance. As one of the most important issues in the science of spirituality, this problem is accepted and accepted in the main religious and scientific teachings, and human beings are forced and evolved on the basis of the genetic material and natural temperament of their parents. But does man have to oppose this religious-scientific principle and has no authority at all? Are the decrees of self-esteem and the severity of this affect on man deprived of liberty? In response to this question, several readings have taken place within the context of genetic conflict and the function of genes, one of which is the theory of two-faced genealogy. The first figure, assuming that genetic influences are immutable, believes in genetic determinism and denies human freedom. The second figure, relying on genetic studies and the development of appropriate technologies, shouts Promethean determinism and the conquest of the future that can apply the power of death and life to humanity by changing the mechanism of life.. In the present article, we have tried to explain and criticize the theory of gene myth and to prove the possibility of altering the temperament, freedom and personal will of the human being along with the principle of affective temperament and the central gene problem.

According to Heidegger, Aletheia is a category by which one can understand the relationship between phronesis and Agathon; because Heidegger has used Aletheia in its Greek sense, i.e. disclosure and openness and not true in the sense of correspondence with the reality. Having accepted Aletheia as disclosure and openness, the relationship between phronesis and Agathon becomes possible in two ways. Firstly, phronesis, as conceived by Heidegger, refers to a mode of disclosure and openness or to put it more precisely, a mode of the existence of Dasein which is related to praxis and action and leads Dasein towards the best action, i.e. existential being. Agathon is also the source of Aletheia. To put it otherwise, it is the source of disclosure and openness as well as the source of being and Dasein. Secondly, Heidegger does not attribute the transcendence in Agathon to any supra-temporal and spatial existence, i.e. God, rather to Dasein himself. Said differently, Agathon includes the being and existing capabilities in Dasein and the latter’s transcendence lies in passing through the existing condition and reaching existential being which is possible through overcoming the habits and reaching disclosure and openness. Thus, Agathon is the touchstone of the behaviors of Dasein. This is what Heidegger refers to as the call of conscience in his discussion of phronesis and considers it a basis for phronetic action; this is a call that comes from Dasein and invites him to reach a mode of existential being that would allow it to know himself as a Dasein and act according to it.

The problem of knowledge and level of human knowledge of objects is one of the important issues of the history of thought and philosophy. Hakim Mulla'abdolrazzagh Lahiji (1072 AH) and John Locke (1632-1704) are among the philosophers who have investigated the subject of knowledge and level of human knowledge. Mohaghghegh e Lahiji believes in a theory that in Islamic philosophy refers to it as a "Phantasm of Representative" (Shabah e Mohaki).In his book, Shavaregh Al-Elham, he states that we when knowledge to objects do not achieve in the their essence and reality, but achieve the phantasm that represent from the outer object. John Locke, also, in his precious book, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , recognizes two different meanings of essence and distinguishes between the real essence and the nominal essence of objects, and knows our knowledge of things about their nominal essence. The similarity between Lahiji and Locke is that both know power of human are more limited than they are to achieve the reality and the essence of objects, but they differ in the quiddity of knowledge and perception.

Phronesis is comparable both in terms of its existence and essence in Heidegger’s and Mullā Sadrā’s thoughts. Heidegger believes in the superiority of phronesis over different aspects of Dasein's disclosedness and revelation such as episteme, techne and sophia, while following Aristotle’s viewpoint, Mullā Sadrā maintains that sophia could be human’s original contingency and mentions that sophia has superiority over all sciences even phronesis. On the other hand, although Mulla Sadra has openly spoken about the superiority of sophia, he has noted the unity of sophia and phronesis to achieve happiness. Moreover, these two philosophers’ opinions in issue, doer, end, and essence of phronesis are comparable. Following Aristotle, Mullā Sadrā believes that phronesis subject is human’s soul and its evolution, while Heidegger maintains that phronesis subject is from Dasein's existence. Such an attitude about subject, doer, end, and essence dominates phronesis, so that Heidegger considers phronesis as an aspect of Dasein's existence and Mulla Sadra considers it as an aspect of knowledge. However, both of these philosophers consider the end of phronesis as the achievement of human to the existence of the original, while they have given different definitions of the existence of the original based on their different bases. According to Mullā Sadrā, the existence of the original is remarkable due to the attention to the origin and resurrection, while Heidegger’s definition of the existence of the original is not directed toward the origin and resurrection, but instead focuses on issues such as self-discovery, attendance, and attention to death.

Aristotle is the first philosopher who specifically focuses on phronesis or practical wisdom in detail. He has dealt with it in three areas of essence, elements of phronetic act, and phronesis functions. For Aristotle, phronesis was a moral and intellectual virtue and a prerequisite for the prosperity of every individual and community. In his elaboration of the ontological position of phronesis, Aristotle differentiates it from other intellectual virtues such as episteme, techne, intuitive intellect, and Sophia. He argues that these last three items have to do with theory, while phronesis is about praxis and practice. He also differentiates between phronesis and Techne. lthough techne, like phronesis, is about practice, practice in techne is of poiesis and construction nature. Phronesis, on the other hand, is a comprehensive and applied type of knowledge that not only dictates the daily activities, but also utilizes knowledge as a guide and a calculator. Moreover, what is referred to as an action in phronesis encompasses a variety of elements like perceiving the goal, desire, rational deliberation and prohairesis or rational choice. Aristotle also believes that phronesis gives a valuable framework for leading man’s life.

Heraclitus was one of the important pre-Socratic philosophers who had some scattered notes on ethics. In order to understand his ethical views, in addition to referring to his existing notes, it is necessary to pay attention to the context in which his philosophy was formed. Heraclitus was under the influence of two traditions of his time. The first was the influence of Homer and early poets and philosophers, such as Solon, Bias of Priene, and the like, who were distinctively characterized by believing in human-like Gods or anthropomorphism. The other was the influence of a new scientific and technical tradition which was developed during the same century in Miletus under the influence of some figures such as Thales and Anaximander, who were mainly concerned with cosmology, that is, an understanding of the quality of the creation, survival and, finally, annihilation of the world order. In fact, Heraclitus’s philosophy can be viewed as a bridge between these two different traditions. Since he considered the world order and human order to be the same, it can be said that his main purpose and concern was explaining the status of human beings in the physical world and not the physical world itself. The ethics of Heraclitus, similar to those of other ancient Greek philosophers, described a kind of ethics of virtue, the core of which comprised virtue and happiness. In the field of virtue, he dealt with both moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Regarding moral virtues, through distinguishing bodily joys from non-bodily joys, he ultimately rejected excessive acts and introduced moderation in joys as the criterion for human behavior. With respect to intellectual virtues, Heraclitus also relied on the knowledge of wisdom and acknowledged that wisdom does not simply mean to have vast knowledge; rather, it means a kind of conscious and well-scrutinized knowledge which conforms to logos. As a result, he mainly emphasized intellectual rather than ethical virtues. Finally, he viewed man’s happiness a result of knowing and behaving in line with logos.

Descartes strictly asserts that he deduces his physical principles from his own metaphysic. While some scholars believe that his claim is exaggerative (or even misleading), some others take it as plausible (or even determining). This study, with regard to the latter, aims to explain Descartes’ anti-teleologism in physics based on his metaphysical principles. The authors suggest five different explanations. (1) Descartes’ approach to epistemic validity of propositions concerning external object requires his anti-teleologism; (2) for Descartes, our understanding fails to recognize any possible limit that belongs to indefinite subjects; that is why we cannot appropriately pursue the telos of natural object. (3) According to Descartes, contrary to Aristotelian tradition, we cannot always conclude telos from mechanism. (4) Assuming a telos for natural object, if it refers to “where the motion leads” or to “that for the sake of which the motion is being leaded”, is either self-contradictory or inconsistent with Descartes’ metaphysical principles. It is so, even if our assumption refers to “an end which the object is consciously pursuing” or to “one which the object is unconsciously pursuing”. (5) The role of non-deceiving God in Descartes’ metaphysics demands his anti-teleologism. At the end, authors explain how we must understand Descartes’ usage of “conclusion” if we are to get a consistent reading of his physics.

In Meno dialogue, Plato points to a problem, which, nowadays, is known as value problem among epistemologists. This problem stems from two accepted premises in the field of epistemology. Based on the first premise, knowledge is implicitly defined as true justified or warranted belief. The second premise also makes the point that the value of the justification or warrant at least appears to be derived from the value of true belief and thus it is reducible to the value of truth. Taking these two premises into account, Zagzebski claims that externalist theories and particularly reliabilist theories cannot escape from the trap of the value problem. Zagzebski’s suggestion for explaining the extra value of knowledge is the reconsideration of the relationship between knowledge and knower. Like acts, which gain extra value from the actor’s motives, belief gains extra value from the possessor’s epistemic motives and reach to the level of knowledge. She believes that love of truth is the most basic motive which makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief. Although Zagzebski’s explanation of the extra value of knowledge has not faced the problems which reliablists struggle with, her explanation is subjected to serious criticisms of a different kind which are addressed in part in the present paper.

Mystical virtues are among the long-lasting areas of study for the Muslim thinkers. This approach comes from religious ethics, from the Holy Quran in particular, that specifically focuses on the relationship between God and man. In this study, we have reviewed three important pillars of soul, virtues, and salvation in addition to introducing various approaches toward Islamic ethics, especially theosophical ethics in view of Imam Khomeini. Following his predecessors, Imam Khomeini analyzes soul philosophically and finally comes up with a theosophical analysis of soul and its stages. This ethical approach rests on the pillar of virtues. In view of Imam Khomeini, purification of the soul and gaining virtues are mid-stage spiritual perfections, the attaining of which is an introduction to guidance toward spiritual path. Inspired by religious sources, Imam Khomeini accepts philosophical virtues in his presentation of religious virtues. It is through contemplation on religious virtues that theosophical virtues become meaningful. If the procedure of purification of soul takes place effectively through removing vices and attaining virtues, the result shall be human salvation. By Salvation, Imam Khomeini refers to monotheism that is the ultimate goal of human spiritual and theosophical journey.

In his discussion of the old problem of induction, Nelson Goodman refers to something that was later called the method of reflective equilibrium by John Rawls and was employed by him in order to infer a theory of justice in the domain of political philosophy. He claimed that in a liberal society, the selection of a particular principle regarding justice requires an arbitrary preference. To solve the problem, Rawls considers an initial situation through the developments of which people come to an agreement over the normative principles of justice. For him, these principles should be reconciled with our moral judgments concerning particular cases via the method of reflective equilibrium. The employment of this method came to be criticized by some philosophers and defended by others. It seems that ethical problems, and in particular, problems of applied ethics, cannot be solved only by an appeal to moral theories and abstract moral principles. Thus despite many controversies about this method, it is so useful in the field of ethics, and in particular, applied ethics, that some people have claimed that it is the only useful method in ethics.

Christology in the western tradition is as old as Christianity itself. Jesus Christ is one of the most mysterious characters in the history of Christianity. This vagueness is not due to various conflicting interpretations in regard to the person of Christ which came about much later than the time of Christ’s emergence as a historical personality. On the contrary، the source of these conflicting views is within the New Testament. On the one hand، some scholars who could be viewed as followers of the Hebraic-Judaic tradition، have attempted to portray a historical image of Jesus rather than insisting on divine nature of Christ who has come to redeem humanity from the ‘First Sin’. The first interpretation is termed as Judeo-Christian vector and the second approach is conceptualized as the Paul-Johnian interpretation of Christianity. In other words، the dominant view is the Paul-Johnian interpretation which has been able to marginalize the other view in the course of history of the Christian religion.

Aristotle's virtue ethics is a teleological ethics, namely, for him, the purpose of achieving moral virtues by human beings is to obtain eudaimonia. The best interpretation of eudaimonia in Aristotle is human flourishing that is the main axis of Aristotle's ethics and also contemporary virtue ethics. Aristotle's analysis of human flourishing that is performed in biological context is based on the concept of ergon or function. Therefore, Aristotle, in description of human flourishing, emphasizes on the exclusive function of human being. For Aristotle the proper function of human being is not only nutrition, development, and reproduction because these are common between human beings on the one hand, and animals and planets, on the other hand. Hence, it rests the rational activity that is the exclusive function of human being. This activity is to be in conformity with the best and most perfect virtue. Philippa Foot, one of the most important contemporary philosophers of virtue ethics, presents an analysis of human flourishing through achieving moral values that in despite of its similarities has important differences to Aristotle's analysis. In description of human being, Foot emphasizes extremely on the biological aspect of human being in relation to Aristotle. Thus, he neglects of the other proper characteristics of human being. This problem brings about some difficulties and ambiguities in Foot's analysis of human flourishing and makes her view encounter with serious criticisms.

One of the most debated problems during the Middle Ages was the problem of the ontology of general concepts or universals which originated from the three important questions of Porphyry in his Introduction to Aristotle's Categories, i.e. Isagogé. The translation of this work from Greek to Latin and its commentary by Boethius is an important factor to flourish the problem of ontology of universals and to appear three main views concerning this problem: realism, conceptualism, and nouminalism. It seems that, nevertheless, among the important causes of extension and development of this problem in Middle Ages is its close relationship with some of Christian doctrines such as God's foreknowledge, trinity, and original sin. Therefore, it can to say that theological motives of medieval thinkers have had a great influence on flourishing and extension of the debates of universals. One of the most theologian problems that has a close relationship with the problem of universals is the doctrine of original sin. The account of the nature of original sin and quality of its transmission from Adam and Eve to human generation from some thinkers of Middle Ages such as Anselm and Odo became the main cause of emerging the collective realism theory concerning the ontology of universals.

The term of ethics of belief is appeared for the first time in Clifford''s well-known essay by the same title in 1876. According to Clifford''s saying that became known afterwards as Clifford''s Credo or Principle «It is wrong always، everywhere، and for anyone، to believe anything upon insufficient evidence». This debate from the time of its presentation by Clifford has been the subject of different controversies. The main problem behind these controversies was that whether human beliefs are principally under the will of human beings to be evaluated morally or they are، like many of mental states، involuntary and passive and so excused of any moral evaluation. Some say that our beliefs are involuntary and are not under our control. In contrast، some believe in the impact of the will on our beliefs or the doxastic voluntarism. Depending on the amount of influence of the will on our beliefs، doxastic voluntarism is divided into two general kinds: direct voluntarism and indirect voluntarism. The doxastic voluntarism (direct/indirect)، on the other hand، can divide into descriptive voluntarism and normative voluntarism. In normative voluntarism، we can say about a kind of epistemic deontologism in our beliefs and it is this epistemic deontologism that entails the ethics of belief. In effect، only when we can say about the ethics of belief that we believe in the epistemic deontologism in our beliefs. Martyr Motahhari believes that the reasoning (ta‘aqqul) and the thinking (tafakkur) as mental actions are in direct control of our will. For him، there is a difference between opinion (‘aqida) and thinking (tafakkur). In his view، thinking is the opinion based on a rational process which can bring about the knowledge. Taking in consideration the process of forming knowledge from him، shows that he believes in a kind of epistemic deontologism. Thus he gives some advices about the ways of acquiring the knowledge that we can place them under the title ethics of belief such as avoidance of intellectual stagnation، distinguishing between belief and the owner of belief and like that.