mansour nasiri

How does unconscious matter become conscious? How does our physical part, which lacks consciousness, have such a subjective quality? This is the explanatory gap in the problem of consciousness or the hard problem of consciousness which comes from a physicalist (eliminativist physicalism) point of view. From the opposite point of view, that is, dualism, the mind-body problem has led to the problem of consciousness and the explanation of how our unconscious physical (matter) part (substance) is related to our conscious mental part (substance). If the problem of consciousness is the result of such views (eliminativism and dualism), is it possible to adopt a different perspective so that the problem does not arise at all? Or find a solution for it (maximum answer) or at least determine the right way to solve the problem (minimum answer)? The current research goes into this issue by adopting subjectivism and holism to make its subjective holism theory. Therefore, it gives a positive (maximum and minimum) answer to the above questions.

One of the critical issues addressed by David Griffin, which has been a significant concern for him, is the question of divine benevolence and its relation to the problem of evil. This paper employs an analytical and argumentative approach. We aim to engage with Griffin’s assertion that, contrary to popular belief, God’s benevolence contributes to the existence of evil in the world. Griffin argues that a benevolent and creative God encourages the world to experience higher and more thrilling values, moving it beyond a state of stagnation and inertia. However, this divine intention leads to the existence of evil, as every being, in its alignment with God’s overarching purpose of achieving greater good for the world, possesses self-determining power, which inherently brings the risk of evil. In another view, Griffin maintains that God, faced with such evils, is a companion to human suffering rather than a mere observer of worldly evils. This study concludes that Griffin’s view is ultimately indefensible due to its minimization of moral good in favor of aesthetic good, and the prevalence of evil in the world resulting from a God who is not omnipotent.

In the history of Philosophy, there have been three general approaches to relation between faith in God and faith in other religious facts on the one hand, and reasoning on the other hand, including strong rationalism, Fideism, and a combination of these two approaches such as Agustin’s opinion. This paper has been written to show that based on the Holy Qur’ān, people indeed establish their faith based on volition, not inference. The Holy Qur’ān says that a minimal level of rationality is enough to have faith in God and after that, there is not any other way for people rather than choosing faith. According to the Holy Qur’ān, volition is so determinative for faith that God has planned some experiments to put people in voluntary situations. This approach shows that the Holy Qur’ān’s point of view rejects the philosophical idea of Strong Rationalism for faith in God. In the Holy Qur’ān (the Muslims’ Holy Book), there are several ways to approve God’s existence. On the one hand, some of them are arguments and some are evidences used in special ways that are not similar to the arguments. On the other hand, some different factors are mentioned as factors effective on people’s faith in God. These factors include cases not classified in rational categories such as arguments and evidences. Moreover, some situations are described in this Holy Book that show people choose their faith voluntarily. It will be important to find that how much is the contribution of each mentioned factor in having faith in God. Overall, it should be mentioned that analyzing the nature of faith is not the main task of this paper, but it is just a study about the comparison between the effect of reason on faith and the effect of volition according to the Holy Qur’ān.

Every great philosopher, especially every epistemologist, has been concerned with perception, notably vision. This is because perception, especially vision, is the most basic, , way of contact with the outside world, and all our cognitive states are somehow related to it. Theories of perception, which center around vision, found their way from the Greco-Roman tradition into the Islamic tradition. Considerations on the matter begin with Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq and continue with the biggest turn in the history of the problem by Avicenna and Ibn al-Haytham, until we reach al-Suhrawardī's turn. He presents a completely philosophical theory, refines his perception (vision) theory, and puts aside every bit of physics, physiology, and geometry from it. In this inquiry, we illustrate, using an analytical and historical approach, the theory of perception (vision) in Islamic world scholars from Hunain to al-Suhrawardī and show its historical development until it becomes purely philosophical. Meanwhile, the role of the sciences in this movement and the role of the interaction between science and philosophy (or other sciences) in the development of knowledge can be seen

The consensus gentium argument is a commonly cited argument in favor of the existence of God. It draws upon the widespread belief in God as evidence supporting His existence. Although the argument has not received the same level of attention from philosophers as other arguments, it has nevertheless been a subject of ongoing debate, modification, and revision. In recent decades, as new debates in epistemology emerged, Linda Zagzebski, a prominent contemporary epistemologist and philosopher of religion, presented a fresh formulation of the consensus gentium argument. She finds the traditional formulation of the argument, based on inference to the best explanation, to be problematic, as there are viable alternative explanations, such as psychological and sociological factors, that can account for the widespread belief in God. Zagzebski develops her version of the consensus gentium argument for the existence of God by incorporating her insights from the epistemology of trust. Challenging the notion of epistemic authority, she asserts that placing trust in our own cognitive faculties necessitates trusting the cognitive faculties of others as well. Consequently, the presence of widespread belief in God among others serves as prima facie evidence supporting the existence of God. By employing an analytical approach, this article asserts that Zagzebski's formulation overcomes the challenges encountered by previous versions of the argument. While acknowledging its own limitations, it contends that Zagzebski's formulation proves to be more successful than traditional formulations.

The present article, in addition to an introduction to the nature of the soul, consists of three main sections. In the first part, after referring to different views on the nature of the soul, we identify Ibn Molahemi's position and show that he believes in the materiality of the soul. In the second part, his two arguments for rejecting the immaterial soul are explained. And in the third section, we present seven arguments of philosophers about the immateriality of the soul and analyze and examine them from Ibn Molahemi's point of view.

Nowadays, theories of the philosophy of mind, are divided into illusionist and non-illusionist. In relation to the Mind Problem (MP), Illusionism of Soul (IS) considers soul and all of the unphysical-mental events (like immaterial personal identity, non-physical consciousness and freewill, non-metaphysical morality, etc.) as an illusion and believes that science will completely explain them in the future. The authors have seen IS in neurophilosophy and Daniel Dennett's Center of Narrative Gravity (CNG). This essay is devoted to explaining IS and the two views on MP, and finally to comparatively comparing them. In this library research paper, we found that the two theories are common in physicalist-evolutionist basics that cause to consider mental events as an illusion and reject dualism; and they are different in eliminativism. we conclude that the mind-brain identity, which is the most important basic of illusionism, has many consequences; for example, the transformation of man into a machine, the unification of man with other animals, and certain ideas about a philosophical zombie.

Contrary to what has been stated in most accounts that Hume intends to make arguments against the existence of God, he aims to attack the claim that religious propositions can be argued; not completely reject these propositions. He considers these propositions epistemologically outside of human knowledge but ontologically accepts the existence of God. With such a view, we can dismiss atheistic-agnostic interpretations and relate him to a kind of mysticism. The key to deciding whether or not Hume is a mystic is to determine what criteria we have to consider someone a mystic. Two very influential components here are (1)the belief in the existence of God;  (2) the belief that the existence of God is far from our usual reasoning (antirational or irrational).And the second component is enough to call someone like Wittgenstein a fideist. We claim that there is clear evidence of these components in Hume’s works; therefore, what reason do we have to remove Hume from the circle of fideism and mysticism? In this study, after an introduction to the concept and types of fideism, we show that Hume, based on his works, surpasses skepticism and manifests a special kind of fideism.While there is an emphasis on the mystery of the proposition that God exists, he combines Christian faith, in aform that is inseparable from illogical and mysterious propositions such as the incarnation of God. Thus, Hume can be called a Christian mystic.

Aromatics form a wide group of compounds that include benzene and compounds that are similar to benzene in terms of chemical behavior. Unlike alkenes and alkynes, benzene and other aromatic compounds do not show a tendency to carry out addition reactions, in this research, aromatic compounds were investigated to achieve the use of the borazine part for the design of molecular dyes. After collecting the data, Hyper Chem 8.0.3 Gaussian Viewer, Chem Draw software were used to analyze the data. The results obtained from hyperpolarizability calculations showed that the magnitude of the first hyperpolarizability tensor of all molecules is relatively average, and NO2 and NH2 have the highest amounts of N and B isomers, respectively. Also, the calculations showed that the first hyperpolarizability value of the isomer is higher than the isomer B with the substitutions removed. On the other hand, these amounts of the N isomer are lower than the β isomer with donor substitutions.

Explanatory defense of theism is a method based on "inference to the best explanation", and probability that Swinburne defends. In this method, monotheistic theism, as a hypothesis, competes with other competing hypotheses, such as materialism, humanism, and non-monotheistic theism. This competition is in the form of inference to the best. In this article, we examine Swinburne's method by stating the main elements of his view. We have come to the conclusion that Swinburne's quantitate method in defense of theism, the use of challengeable premises, and non-adjutancy of causal explanation are among the most important challenges to which his view is faced.

In this article, Griffin's conflict with traditional theists in the explanation of natural evil is discussed. Traditional theists, (Griffin considers theists who believe in the absolute power of God, secondly, believe that the power of beings is the result of God's granting them power, and thirdly, believe in the creation of the world out of nothing) as traditional.) This is how they explain that, first, they are caused by the descent of an angel or demonic power. Secondly, the existence of this villain is an integral part of the natural world with its governing laws. Thirdly, their existence is necessary for the development of moral and spiritual virtues for humans. David Griffin, the philosopher of dynamic religion, although sometimes attributes natural evil to satanic power in a different way, and even considers the evil of this world to be the product of the inherent laws of this world, but his conflict with traditional theists is over the doctrine of God's absolute power, why God has This attribute has not created the world in such a way that there is less pain and suffering in it and intervened in order to achieve this. In other words, why doesn't God exercise his omnipotence in uprooting the terrible evil.

One of the components of John Cottingham's thinking - a contemporary English philosopher - in the relationship between reason and religion, is the distinction between the field of science and religion. He has presented this distinction in two parts: the type of issues in the field of science and religion, and The method of inference in the field of science and religion. According to Cottingham, religious issues are related to outside the field of human knowledge, and the way of debunking them is not the way of debunking the best explanation in empirical sciences; Because despite the problem of evil, theistic hypothesis cannot be considered as the best explanation for the phenomena of the world. His proposed model for the field of religion is the legal model; That is, the fact that the explanation presented is not incompatible with empirical evidence is enough to justify religious belief. He considers his point of view between extreme faithism and pseudo-scientific inferentialism. This view is criticized in several ways; Including: 1. Failure to pay attention to the function of secondary philosophical concepts in understanding the metaphysical dimension of the world of matter and abstractions, 2. The problem of "ignoring", 3. The inefficiency of the proposed model with regard to the issue of evil.

John Cottingham, a contemporary English philosopher, considers the best way to understand religious beliefs to be an empathic understanding. He calls his theory “the epistemology of involvement”. Based on this theory, in order to understand religious beliefs, one should put aside the detachment approach and by entering the life of faith, provide the conditions for the realization of the religious experiences of the believers, and at the same time, maintain the critical opinion in this sympathetic participation in religion. He considers such an approach to be a middle way between Kierkegaard's irrationalism and Plantinga's relativism and considers it generalizable to other philosophical fields. This approach faces criticism. First, before entering a religious life, it is necessary to evaluate its worldview, and this evaluation precedes the practical system and literary and emotional texts of that religion. Second, there is no connection between an empathetic understanding of religion and entering into a life of faith, and thirdly, by entering into a life of faith, the acceptance of a belief will be involuntary, and after the realization of such a belief, it is not possible to criticize it.

This article is an effort to show that during the history of philosophy – both in the epistemology and ethics domains – evidentialism based on extreme rationalism has tremendously influenced the true mechanism of the formation of faith in God. In the light of a kind of determinism, it has averted attentions from the role of other functions such as emotions, passions, and especially volition in the formation of faith in theists within the common understanding framework. Among the contemporary thinkers, William James and Plantinga have tried to modify this deterministic approach and revive those practical aspects of the formation of faith that are always forgotten. The salient common point in the theories of these two thinkers are the attention to the practical aspects of faith within the common understanding framework and the emphasis on the significant role of volition – in line with reason – in the formation of faith. This way, it can be observed that the opinions of William James and Plantinga about the way the mechanism of faith in God is formed complete each other.

Phenomenal Conservatism is an approach to epistemological justification that, based on "appearances" and "seemings" and in line with the theory of common sense epistemology, attempt to set up an internal and non-inferential justification, at least for some kind of beliefs. According to this view, justification and non-justification have a direct relationship with the mental state of the agent. Based on this assumption that “Things are as they seem”, phenomenal conservatism offers its central idea that if, for an agent, something seems to be true -and there is no defeater for that until doubting in - that agent thereby has at least some justification for believing that. In this article, we will interpret this new approach with an empathetic attitude and, in addition to explaining its main components, we will effort to answer the most important objections of phenomenal conservatism and show that this view is a significant approach to the justification and rationality of human beliefs.

The problem of divine foreknowledge and its conflict with the human free will is one of the oldest issues in Abrahamic religions. Solutions proposed so far for the problem have deployed an absolutist approach to concepts. This paper aims to solve the old problem by drawing on modern sciences, particularly the findings of Einstein’s theory of relativity with its relativistic approach. This research has been carried out with an analytic-critical method after collection of data from available sources. In the theory of relativity, an incident occurring in the future from the perspective of a temporal observer occurs at present from the perspective of an atemporal observer. Given this, we conclude that what is called ‘foreknowledge’ is indeed foreknowledge from the perspective of a human observer, but from the viewpoint of an atemporal observer, it qualifies as knowledge of the present, whether or not the observer is a material essentially temporal being, which has—given the theory of relativity—incidentally been atemporal, or an immaterial essentially atemporal being like God. As a consequence, an atemporal present piece of knowledge does not conflict the human will just because it always knowledge of the present.

The later Wittgenstein believes that if we want to understand religious beliefs, we should know and get involved with the two concepts of language games and forms of life (which he uses to describe his teachings). In fact, it can be said that his understanding of the rationality of religious beliefs is one based on language games and forms of life. In other words, the rationality of religious beliefs is given its meaning by these two metaphors. Therefore, if one wants to make rational his religious beliefs, he should understand this rationality in the context of forms of life. That is to say, if a religious person has based his religious beliefs in the context of forms of life, then his religious beliefs is rational from the viewpoint of the later Wittgenstein. As a result, the meaning of rationality in religious beliefs should not be taken and judged the same as the meaning of rationality in science. According to the later Wittgenstein’s viewpoint, our religious beliefs do not need any justification – either rational or historical – and an individual who tries to rationalize the religious matter based on another language game’s rules is in fact an irrational person, because he is totally unaware of the station of religious beliefs. In this article, we aim to both explain the later Wittgenstein’s viewpoint to the rationality of religious beliefs and explicate the current criticisms and shortcomings of the concepts such as language games.

Muslim philosophers consider any contingent being to be a combination of nature and existence. Since Mirdamad, the question has been raised as to which of the two is the fundamental/objective (Asill). Following the discussion of the fundamentality of the existence and whatness, the question of Graduate, the question was whether the existence is graduated or the whatness. Those who believed in the fundamentality of existence believed that graduteness is of that existence. On the other hand, those who believed in the fundamentality of whatness believed that graduteness is of that whateness. In the meantime, Mir Qawam al-Din Razi has taken a third promise. He believes that graduteness in whatness means inherent presuppositions are impossible and in transverse presuppositions whose derivation is not documented in the essence and essence of the subject is also impossible, but in transverse presuppositions whose derivation is documented in the essence and essence of the subject, graduteness occurs. The main issue of this article is to examine Mir Qawamuddin Razi's view on graduteness in transverse shipments. The purpose of this study is to show the third promise in this issue that has been neglected so far and the research method is descriptive-analytical and to some extent with a historical approach. The conclusion of this study is that the words of Mir Qawamuddin Razi can be correct and defensible according to the words of Mashaei philosophers such as Aristotle.

The aim of the present study was to investigate the mediating role of defense mechanisms in the relationship between behavioral brain systems and Alexithymia in students of Sari Farhangian University.  

The statistical population of this study was all students of Farhangian University of Sari in the academic year of 2018-2019. From this statistical population, a sample of 234 people was selected by stratified random method.  To measure the research variables, the Defense Mechanisms Questionnaire (DSQ) questionnaire, Carver and White Behavioral Activation and Activation Systems Questionnaire and Alexithymia Questionnaire were used. The proposed model was evaluated using structural equation modeling.

In general, the results showed that brain-behavioral systems and defense mechanisms have a direct role in Alexithymia(p <0/01). Behavioral activation system and developed defense mechanism showed a negative and significant effect on alexithymia and behavioral inhibition system and defense mechanisms (undeveloped and neuroticism defense styles) showed a positive and significant effect on emotional malaise.Also, brain-behavioral systems with the mediating role of defense mechanisms indirectly played a role in Alexithymia(p <0/01). Therefore the results showed that the proposed model of causal relationships between these variables had an acceptable fit.

That brain-behavioral systems in the form of a causal model play in the role of vulnerable factors with the mediating role of the defense mechanism in the occurrence of alexithymia

This paper is an analysis of Cosmological Argument whit a look on a paper that has been written by Kevin Davey and Mark Lippelmann.In this paper, the cosmological argument from cause, has been formulated in a mathematical way and it has been shown that a complete explanation can be possible in a closed system physically but not in a philosophical view and not in terms of cosmological argument. In other words the cosmological argument has been carried into a physical atmosphere and has been subjected in supported and suspended chains. This physical view on cosmological argument, leads to varied result in varied conditions and the final explanation in and closed systems is different. The use of formula and pictures of chains is a way to show that what happens exactly in this challenge.

Psychological factors play a key role in peoplechr('39')s emotional responses to different social situations. 

This study aimed to investigate the mediating role of defense mechanisms in the relationship between social phobia and alexithymia, in the students of Farhangian University, Sari City, Iran.    

This was an analytical, correlational study that specifically used structural equation modeling. The statistical population included all students of the Farhangian University of Sari city, Iran, in the academic year of 2019-2020. A sample of 234 people was recruited with the available sampling method. The social phobia inventory, defense mechanism questionnaire, and Toronto alexithymia scale were used to measure the research variables. Finally, the proposed model was evaluated using structural equation modeling.  

The results showed that social phobia variables, undeveloped defensive mechanisms, and psychotic defensive mechanisms are positively correlated with alexithymia. Also, there is a significant negative correlation between developed defensive style and alexithymia (P = 0.001). The results indicated significant correlations of social phobia (r = 0.28), undeveloped defensive style (r = 0.31), psychotic defensive style (r = 0.28), and developed defensive style (r = -0.30) with alexithymia (P = 0.001). Moreover, the research model was approved: defensive mechanisms mediate the relationship between social phobia and alexithymia in the students. The defensive mechanisms and social phobia affect 48% of the alexithymia variable.   

The students with adaptive defensive mechanisms experience lower social phobia and alexithymia symptoms. Also, social phobia indirectly affects alexithymia through the mediating role of defense mechanisms.

The al-Wahid principle has been constantly drawing attention from Muslim philosophers and theologians throughout the history of Islamic thought, while some have sought to substantiate this principle and some others have attempted to criticize and reject it. It was not only theologians who challenged the principle, it also did not sit well with some philosophers who were critical of it. One of these philosophers was Aliquli Bin Qarachghai Khan Torkamani, a Safavid era philosopher and pupil to Mulla Rajabali Tabrizi. He challenges Ibn Sina’s arguments for the al-Wahid, believing that if we consider the Necessary Existent as a pure simple entity that is aware of oneself and others and is also able to create others, then, knowing that knowledge and power are identical with His essence, we can say that the emanation of the multiple from the Necessary Existent will not require existence of multiple aspects within Him. Accordingly, we can accept the emanation of the multiple from the one. In this article we undertake an explication and critique of Aliquli Bin Qarachghai Khan’s view of the al-Wahid principle. In brief, this article argues that although to some degree his critiques of Ibn Sina’s proofs are successful, he fails to take an all-inclusive approach to the issue.

In this paper, the scientific methodology of the contemporary philosopherImre Lakatos is revised to construct a methodology for theological systems. In this methodology, each theological system consists of the following main elements: (1) hard core I, (2) protective wall, (3) hard core II, and (4) auxiliary hypotheses. We will expound the criteria for the evaluation of different theological systems and show how a theological system prevails over other theological systems in the light of these criteria. These criteria are of two types: first, the criteria that we have presented for a successful and progressive theological system; second, the criteria mentioned in the philosophy of science for the evaluation of competitor scientific hypotheses and theories. In conclusion, we present the results of our proposed theological plan. Some of the results include preserving religion from distortion and deterioration, resolving the disputes over the relation between science and religion or reason and religion, and considering theology as a science parallel to other sciences.

Dr. Khosrow Bagheri has devised his model of religious science under the “Foundational Model.” My main concern here is to evaluate this model. In this paper, I introduce this view within five sections, and then criticize it on 10 points. In my view, the Foundational Model faces major problems in its foundation and its construction. Some of these problem are as follows: a black-and-white view of scientology, determination of three areas in religion, the relationship between religious knowledge and other kinds of knowledge, consequences of uncovering the error of the hypothesis about religious texts, the introduction of “religious metaphysics” or “metaphysics emerging from religion,” and the claim that religion affects both realms of discovery and evaluation. Given my criticisms, it turns out that the model cannot take a new step towards arriving at a religious science.

One of the important concepts in epistemology is the that of evidence. Evidence is a kind of reason that is indicative of the truth of the proposition that is the object of one’s doxastic attitude. In this paper, we assess the nature of evidence. There are three important views on the nature of evidence: psychologism, factive propositionalism and non-factive propositionalism. After explaining and assessing the arguments for the three views, we come to the conclusion that the arguments for psychologism is stronger than the ones for propositionalism. So, it seems that the evidence is one’s non-factive mental states.