dr. mohammad saeedimehr

Mulla Sadra uses numerous Quranic verses in his theory of the substantial motion of the soul. However, his philosophy has always faced criticism as to whether his use of Quranic verses is to confirm his own philosophy or not. In this research, after comparing the views of two Quranic exegetes - Allameh Tabatabai and Tabarsi - with Mulla Sadra's Quranic interpretations, we have concluded that Mulla Sadra's interpretations of Quranic verses in his book "Mafatih al-Ghayb" for the topic of substantial motion of the soul are often not aligned with the interpretations of Allameh Tabatabai in "Al-Mizan" and Tabarsi in "Majma' al-Bayan", except in a few cases. It should be acknowledged that Mulla Sadra cannot detach himself from his active, logical, and philosophical mind when attending to the verses in this discussion. The conclusion drawn from the meaning of verses in these two exegeses generally does not govern the meaning of motion, contrary to what Mulla Sadra witnesses in the substantial motion of the soul. If a meaning of motion can be inferred from the verses in "Al-Mizan" and "Majma' al-Bayan", it is hardly applicable to the substantial motion of the soul. It seems that in these verses, Mulla Sadra's philosophical or mystical thought has overshadowed his Quranic interpretations, and in this regard, he has not been unaffected by his philosophical and mystical thinking. He approaches the interpretation of a verse with a mystical or philosophical view, and in this interpretation, he does not draw on narrative references. Therefore, at that time, his words show their difference and distance from other exegeses.

Mystical ethics constitutes one of the three tiers of Avicenna’s Neoplatonic ethical structure. Like his other works on mysticism, Avicenna presents mystical ethics within the intellectual framework inherent in mystical thought itself. In other words, Avicenna's discussion of mystical ethics cannot be fully understood without considering the intellectual tradition of Sufism. However, due to the particular place of scientific ethics in his work, the volume of Avicenna’s writings on mystical ethics is quite limited. Therefore, in this article, other texts written within this intellectual framework are also employed to elaborate on some of the mystical aspects of his ethics. Through additional explanations of these texts, Avicenna’s brief statements are further expanded. Furthermore, the ethics presented in mystical texts encompasses a broad range of concepts, and Avicenna’s mystical ethics also briefly touches on many of these concepts. This article aims to focus solely on the concepts shared between Neoplatonic ethics and mystical ethics. The research will demonstrate that the source of these shared concepts is Sufi thought, although Avicenna found no conflict between them and the Neoplatonic structure of his ethical thought.

The purpose of this research is to answer the question, what is the relationship between God and the universe from the perspective of Mirza Javad Tehrani? For this purpose, his written works were analyzed by means of content analysis of sources in a library manner. Sages in response to this question of rational assumptions such as; They have used the principle of causation, falsification, composition, the principle of oneness, the subject of manifestation, etc., and by proposing a separation between the first creation and the first emission, they have considered the relationship as an existential matter. Mirza Javad, one of the thinkers of the separation school, while not accepting the aforementioned principles, does not consider the claim of the sages to be free of problems. He believes that determining the example of the first creature and expressing the type of relationship is beyond the realm of human knowledge, so we must obey the Sharia texts in this regard. Therefore, the relationship between God and the universe is definitely established. Although its quality is unknown to us.

The transcendent wisdom of Sadra It is a Comprehensive philosophical system That is a reasonable and coherent connection It establishes between three issues: theology, anthropology and epistemology, so that understanding is impossible without any other and the same continuity between these three concepts can give molla sadra to present a different knowledge of other philosophicaI ideologies. Mulla sadra criticizes the principles of his epistemologes, namely principality of existence, gradation of existence, personal unity of existence and substantial motion and he explains the basic topics of anthropology such as the truth of the soul, the relationship between the soul and the body, the relationship between the soul and the powers, and so on. on the other hand, he considered the human soul as an example of God, which in essence, attributes and actions is similar to god. and from the principles of her theology such as simplicity, comprehensiveness and breadth of existence, beyond nature, an attribute such as the knowledge of God and God's activity seeks help to express the resemblance of the human soul to God, and it introduces human as a simple, comprehensive and without quiddity, and science such as divine knowledge and the ability to be creative. The epistemological fruit of the connection between theology, anthropology and epistemology, is the theory of the perfect man, which is both comprehensive of all the divine names and attributes and comprehensive of all the facts of existence. and for this reason, he can be the caliph of God on earth and the mediator of divine grace in all worlds

In the works of Ibn Sina, expressions related to the discussion of will are phrased in a way that allows for two interpretations. Some researchers believe that Ibn Sina considers the attribute of will to be verbally common between the Necessary Being (God) and humanity. In contrast, others argue that he views this attribute as semantically common. Examination of Ibn Sina's works indicates that his expressions, in cases such as the following, have laid the groundwork for the interpretation of verbal commonality: (1) the absence of conceptual conflict in divine attributes, especially knowledge and will; (2) the distinction of will in the Necessary Being and humanity. On the other hand, his expressions regarding the division of will and the comparison of will in humans and the Necessary Being provide the basis for interpreting semantic commonality. It seems plausible to consider Ibn Sina's theory as semantic commonality and, relying on his expressions about will and divine attributes, present an interpretation of evidence supporting verbal commonality. Examining Ibn Sina's works allows us to define will as "a quality in the agent of the world that causes the issuance of an action from him." In this case, the will between God and humans will be semantically common. Within such a definition, the distinction between the will of God and the will of humans will be merely an extensional difference.

From Ibn Sina's point of view, the estimative faculty is one of the most important cognitive principles of action. The prior perception of action, the use of composite imagination for action, the emergence of desire and anger through the perception of profit and harm, helping practical intellect, creating some psychological qualities such as fear or hope, producing false statements, influencing outside the body and mediating between physical states and action are among the functions of this faculty. This faculty needs to be accompanied by other cognitive faculties to have its functions. Due to its association with intellect, human estimation has achieved another function such as dogmatic judgment and making universal propositions. Similarity, experience, needs of other faculties, and the merciful inspirations of God are among the ways through which estimation reaches its perceptions without the help of intellect. In most cases, estimation perceives benefits and harms without judgment but with conceptual perception. Ibn Sina's statements about image eliciting propositions and the passivity of the soul from imaginations prove this claim. Despite Ibn Sina's attention to various dimensions of estimation and its role in action, his thought is incoherent and ambiguous in some cases. For instance, attributing universal perception to estimation in some cases and the impossibility of explaining some functions of estimation

Since the beginning of philosophy, the issue of universals has been a place of attention as one of the most adventurous problems. Its ontological (the state of being of universal) and epistemological functions (the issue of perception of universals) turned it into a problem. For a long time, many thinkers have explored these two aspects of the universal problem. In this article, the aspect epistemology of universals is expected. Allameh Hali has presented theories worthy of attention in this field, which despite their importance, their value is unknown. The purpose of this article is to analyze how he perceives general concepts. The findings of the research indicate the adoption of an almost similar approach to Allameh in the common interpretation of the universal concept, the ratio between two universal concepts, universal types, universal reasoning, the abstraction of universal concepts and their place with Islamic thinkers, but they disagree with their more regarding the refinement of identification and abstraction. has it. Moreover, his view on the theory of abstraction seem questionable.

This article aimed to analyze and compare the position of reason and transmission in the views of Averroes and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi in Dinani’s opinion. It aimed to answer this major question: Have thinkers who believe in the superiority of reason, presented a single concept for it?

The information in this basic research was collected using library method and was processed in a descriptive-analytical way.

By raising the issue of the connection between religion and wisdom, Averroes raised what is called the relationship between philosophy and politics in Greek philosophers’ opinion.Nasir al-Din believed that the principles of reason prevail over transmission. In a great endeavor, he revived reason through transmission. He believed that the principles of religious beliefs were based on certainty, and certainty was realizedthrough rational reasoning and strong logical proof. He considered those religious beliefs as valid which were based on accurate reasoning and logical proof, otherwise, they were uncertain and invalid.

During the analysis of these two approaches based on Dinani’s opinion, it was found that when thinkers talked of reason, they expressed their opinions based on the requirements of their own time and the principles of their philosophical thinking.

Intellect, as one of the tools for human recognition and knowledge, has a high standing among philosophers and thinkers. Respecting the status of intellect, Ibn ‘Arabī deems speculative intellect as powerless in knowing God. He believes that intellect has two positions in recognition of the Exalted God: first, the station of perception; and second, the station of acceptance. He views intellect powerless in terms of perception and recognition of the essence of God and some stages of His identifications and manifestations; but he also maintains that intellect is able to recognize God in terms of perception and in this perspective he does not believe in any limitations for it, even though the accepted subject would not be arguable and provable with the perceptive position of intellect. As one of the eminent Muslim philosophers, although Mullā Ṣadrā also maintains a high status for epistemology, he claims, by accepting limitations of intellect and rejecting absolute authority for it, that man can by means of rational recognitions move toward perfection of his soul and pave the way for perceptions beyond intellect. With reliance on the viewpoints of Ibn ‘Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā concerning intellect and its limitations, the present research is intended to examine their similarities and differences in this respect.

This paper deals with Avicenna’s intellectual system in ethics and shows that his ethical system emerges in a totally Neoplatonic structure. Moreover, I show that he uses many Neoplatonic concepts inside this intellectual system. In the most important stage, to disclose the Neoplatonic system of Avicenna’s thought in ethics, I show that his ethics have levels as the most important property of a Neoplatonic system of thought in all its dimensions, from the point where he starts the discussion of ethics to where he discusses the ultimate aim of the ethical act. The presence of levels in Avicenna’s work is so important that one cannot have a correct understanding of his ethics without attention to them. In his thought, levels are examined in three stages according to Neoplatonic patterns: sensible, imaginable, and intelligible level. That means, all the aspects of Avicenna’s ethics like linguistics, metaphysics, epistemology, anthropology, theories, and moral duties, should be examined on three levels: the sensible, imaginable and, intelligible. In the next step, I attend to the concepts he uses from Neoplatonic thought and has employed them in his intellectual system. Besides the levels, many of these kinds of Neoplatonic concepts have been involved in forming this intellectual system.

One of the most prominent and compelling philosophical responses to the logical problem of evil is Alvin Plantinga's free will defense. However, Michael Almeida, a critic of this defense, argues that while the free will defense has effectively addressed many versions of the logical problem of evil, there are versions, such as those presented by John Mackey, which can be referred to as the logical problem of evil redux. Almeida, who shares Plantinga's beliefs as a theist and incompatibilist, specifically focuses his critique on one of the most controversial assumptions underlying this defense: the notion of universal transworld depravity, which Plantinga claims is an inherent characteristic of all creatures. According to Almeida, this assumption is untenable because absolute divine foreknowledge, influenced by a perspective akin to Molinism, enables God to actualize a morally perfect world without conflicting with human free will. Almeida believes that we can address this problem and defend the existence of God, but it is not the aim of this article to present his solution

The problem of universals can be examined from two aspects: ontological (the state of the external existence of universals) and epistemological (our cognition of universals). This article mainly concerns the ontological aspect. Both of Fakhr al-Din Razi and Khajeh Nasir al-Din Tusi have furnished us with novel views and insights which, in spite of their significance and freshness, have not been yet studied seriously. This paper deals with their views on the ontology of universals. We conclude that they have almost similar opinions about the three different meanings of ‘kulli’ (universal) and three kinds of consideration of quiddity. Nevertheless, their elucidations and refinements of the ontological state of these three kinds of universals are totally different. Moreover, al-Razi’s view on the rational universal (al-kulli al-aqli) and Tusi’s interpretation of the natural universal (al-kulli al-tabi’ee) seems questionable.

One of the important and challenging issues regarding Divine attributes is the that of the existential relationship between Divine Essence and Attributes and the how of Essence`s being qualified with the Attributes of perfection. Khawjah Nasir al-Din Tusi defended the theory of "the identity of God's Essence and Perfect Attributes" in his book Tajrid al-i`tiqad and based it on God's state of being essentially necessary in existence. Now the question is raised that: how can the theory of the identity of Divine Attributes and Perfectional Essence be proved on the basis of the necessity of existence? The hypothesis of this article, using the descriptive-analytical method, is that Khawjah put the concept of "necessity of existence" as an inclusive title for some of his ontological and theological foundations to explain the theory of identity. His main ontological foundations in this topic are the unity of the concept, originality, and gradational state of existence. Also, his use of some theological principles such as "the identity of the Essential necessity with the Existence of  the Supreme Right", "the unity of the Necessary by the Essence", "the simplicity of the Essence of the Necessary by the Essence" and "the reachness of the Necessary by the Essence " which help to argue more fully the theory of identity.

Galen is one of the most prominent thinkers and scientists in antiquity, who paid special attention to the methodology of natural sciences. On the other hand, the transition of Galenic tradition to the Islamic world had a wide impact on different areas of thought, one of which was methodology. Accordingly, studying Galen's scientific methodology plays a significant role in a true understanding of the scientific tradition in the Islamic medieval ages. This article, using the method of text-oriented analytic interpretation, expounds on the status of reason as one of the two main elements of Galen's methodology. In his view, the reason is the main part of the human soul which provides the scientific method both formally and materially. Its formal functions, pertaining to the logical scope, are as follows: demonstration, division and synthesis, definition, similarity and dissimilarity, analysis and synthesis, and indication. On the other hand, in a material sense, the mind provides the necessary prerequisites for the formation of proof and implication by understanding rational axioms.

‘Approved opinions’ and the method of inferring them are one of the topics that have been briefly discussed in Avicenna’s works. According to him, the intellect alone cannot infer ‘approved opinions’, and other components, such as theoretical opinions, reputation, induction, experience, and expediency, must also play positive roles in inferring them. But the method of inferring ‘approved opinions’ from these different components is a matter of debate: while ‘approved opinions’ fall under the category of conventional premises, and Avicenna talks about substantiating these opinions, there are other places in his work that he speaks of the indemonstrable character of the conventional premises. However, with an analytical look at Avicenna’s discussions in the section on the conventional premises in logic and the functions of practical reason and examining his views on ethics, a new explanation can be provided that clarifies the incompatibility of the aforementioned components with the indemonstrability of conventional premises. This explanation originates from this philosophical point in Avicenna’s work that there is a fundamental difference between substantiation and its premise for inferring the ‘approved opinions’ and demonstration and its premises in classical logic and theoretical philosophy. When he talks about substantiating ‘approved opinions’, Avicenna does not mean to demonstrate them, which is incompatible with his view about the indemonstrability of conventional premises. Contrary to demonstration, substantiation can be based on analogy and induction, that is, ‘approved opinions’ can be inferred analogically and inductively. The analogy can also have different premises, from primary and universal premises to experimental and individual ones. Matters such as manners, passions, and human expediencies can also be included in these premises.

The peripatetic tradition of reading Aristotle limits divine providence to celestial bodies and maintains that, according to Aristotle, there is just divine providence per accident by celestial bodies concerning sublunary world. Alexander of Aphrodidsias in his treatise titled as “On Providence”, however, tries to give an Aristotelian version of divine providence so that it would not be in contradiction with the exaltedness of divine causes in superlunary world and would not be per accident. We, in this essay, by pointing to the roots of his Aristotelian conception of divine providence in De Generatione et Corruption and De Caelo, shall show that his specific treatment of divine providence in Aristotle is based on a peculiar theory of causation which in turn will face him with other difficulties in denying providence per accident.

Spinoza and Mulla Sadra, in spite of having different philosophical principles, paid special attention to the problem of immediate knowledge of God. A philosophical dialogue between them can be held, if the two following conditions are satisfied. First, the ontological features of the object of that knowledge -that play the essential role in immediate knowledge- should be identified. In this regard, infinity in Spinoza’s philosophy and lacking quiddity and being superior to the perfection in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy can be cited. Secondly, the definition of the immediate knowledge and its main feature that is relevant to the object of that knowledge should be surveyed. On one hand, Spinoza points out that the truth of this kind of knowledge and complete correspondence between that knowledge and its object are its main characteristics. On the other hand, Mulla Sadra stresses that such knowledge is confined to the existential degree of the knower. The comparison shows that Spinoza, in common with Mulla Sadra, asserts that the immediate knowledge is the most perfect one which the most perfect existent is its object. Nonetheless, the breadth and the narrowness of the meaning of the medium, along with inconsistency in Spinoza’s view and consistency in Mulla Sadra’s position on the immediate perfect knowledge of God are the matters that distinguishes Spinoza’s views from those of Mulla Sadra’s.

Scientific methods are tools for solving the problems of any science. In the new and contemporary era, the independent discussion of some of these popular methods gradually fueled the formulation of science methodology. Although the issue of the method of philosophy was also discussed in the past, today this discussion is followed in an emerging field called meta-philosophy. This article seeks to take an initial step in order to identify the coordinates of Avicenna’s philosophical method. Avicenna does not have an independent and exhaustive discussion of the method of philosophy, and therefore, to identify his philosophical method, one should use his implicit meta-philosophy and by reviewing his works, identify the methods that he actually used. In this article, after an introductory discussion on the method of science and philosophical methodology, I review Avicenna’s discussions on the method of philosophy. In the next step, with a look at the more or less common methods in analytical philosophy, four methods of comparative reasoning, conceptual analysis, logical analysis, and mental test will be selected as models and frameworks for discussion and some examples will be presented for the application of these methods in Avicenna’s philosophy. Recognizing Avicenna’s philosophical method in this framework shows that his philosophy is very similar to contemporary analytical philosophy in terms of method.

There are few issues in the history of human thought that have made people reflect as much as the cognition of God and his attributes. Trying to answer this question has always been one of the serious efforts of thinkers of every era. In the theological thought of Imamiyyah, the opinion of Sheikh Mofid, which is one of the most influential and stable ideas in the field of theology and has caused deep intellectual changes after him, has special privileges in answering the mentioned issue. This article seeks to examine the foundations of Sheikh Mofid regarding the most important issue of divine attributes, i.e. "analysis of the relationship between God's essence and His names and attributes" by referring to his theological thought in the Shia intellectual system. After examining some views of Muslim theologians on this issue, such as "excess", "substitution" and "state theory" as well as analyzing the opinions of supporters and opponents of the Imamiyyah view, i.e. "the identity of the essence with attributes", we try to show the lack of conflict in Sheikh Mofid's statements in proving the principle of identity, considering the principles extracted from his opinions on the aforementioned issue. Finally, we emphasize the superiority of monotheism in Shiite thought as the basis of Sheikh Mofid's view and the final finding of this research, which has been the common feature among Imami theologians after him.

In Avicenna’s thought, one of the most important features of experimental propositions which, whereby they are classified among the principles of demonstration, is their attribution with certainty and he has emphasized its certainty in several expressions. However there are a few statements from Avicenna in which- in a way the absolute certainty of experience is denied. This research, using the method of text-oriented analytic interpretation and critical analysis, explicates how the method of experience, according to Avicenna’s own theoretical and practical foundations, cannot yield certainty. Theoretically, two minimum and maximum reasons demonstrated for this. Based on minimal reason the method of experience brings about pure certainty only in the case of useful constant observation. But in the maximum reason even in the manner of permanent occurrence can't be lead to certainty because due to the experience-based on sensations which according to Avicenna’s final analysis are pseudo-certainty, any kind of experience will be pseudo-certainty. This result is not in conflict with Avicenna’s innovational doctrine about the experience-based propositions, according to which these propositions are based on a demonstration propter quid, because he has already explained in his logical works that a demonstration propter quid which its minor premise is not perpetual cannot yield certainty. In addition, assuming possibility of obtaining certainty in the process of experience, in practice, is very difficult to exactly determine and discover the essential cause, whereby reaching the certainty will be very hard and rare.

Allameh Tabatabai has repeatedly mentioned Etebar matters and wishful thinking and has put them in front of real things. Etebar matters are irregular ideas that are dependent on human will, but after their will, nothing is added to the outside world. Allameh Tabatabai believes that idealism - denial of certain perceptions according to reality - entails the arbitrary of all ideas and consequently, the irregularity and chaos of all human behaviors. This article, by rejecting the mismatch between an idea's intentionality and its non-dependence on man, has shown that the division of things into real affairs and Etebar affairs is not based on belief in realism and certain perception according to the reality and maybe idealists based on Allameh Tabatabai's foundations. We proved that even In Allameh Tabatabai's Interpretation of Idealism we can be logically idealists and at the same time divide things into Etebar affairs and real affairs.

There are different tests for an adequate philosophical theory of perception. One of them is phenomenological testing, which focuses on the conscious aspects of sense experiences. Sense-datum theories that appeal to sense data cannot deliver a satisfactory phenomenology. One of the problems is related to awareness of objects that bear the properties that characterize what it is like for us the austere nature of sense data—as objects that only possess sensible qualities— makes it difficult for the theory to adequately capture the phenomenology of “real” experiences. Other problem is related to the primary qualities. A more specific phenomenological problem area for sense datum theory has concerned the experience of depth. The sense datum theorist rebuts some objection by adopting an ontological and epistemological position.One of the leading theories of perception in the ontology of the Islamic philosophy is the theory of mental existence. The sense-datum theory seems to have many similarities with the theory of mental existence. Using some principles of Transcendent philosophy such as the discussion of the nature union between external objects and their mental forms, the resurrection of sensory and imaginary forms to the soul, the distinction between the first carriers and common carriers and the characteristics of present knowledge, the theory of mental existence can be defended against phenomenological problems.

Mulla Rajab Ali Tabriz is one of the thinkers of the Safavid era and contemporary of Mullā Ṣadrā. On several occasions, he has opposed the principles and foundations of Ṣadrā’s Transcendent philosophy. One of his oppositions is the issue of existence univocality. Tabrizi has strongly opposed the univocality of existence and has tried to prove its homonymity with various arguments. As for the Divine Attributes, he has also denied the attributes by referring to traditions (hadiths). In the present article, by examining these two issues, the weakness of Tabrizi arguments is made known. The drawbacks of Tabrizi’s view are as follows: interpreting narrations without considering the atmosphere and context of the time they were issued, ignoring the connected and separate indications in understanding their true meaning, disregarding narrations that have offered a completely affirmative interpretation of Divine Attributes, the fact that some traditions are irrelevant to this debate but are related to conditionality of the Divine Names and Attributes.

From Aquinas’s viewpoint the intellect is just one of the Faculties of the human soul, and not identical with the very essence of the soul and thus human being possesses an intellect. On the other hand, unlike Plato, he believes that man has no innate concept but he can separate or abstract the forms (Ideas) of natural things. The origin of human concepts is the material world, so the Intellect‘s operation arises from sensation. The intellect knows nothing but what it receives from the senses. From this point of view Aquinas must be seen as an empiricist. Thomas is, however, a Christian philosopher too. God is the immaterial truth, so the natural power of the created intellect falls short to enable it to see the essence of God. Consequently, he believes that humans are sometimes given non-material ideas through divine grace. It increases the intellectual powers so that the forms are ultimately perceived by the human intellect. Nonetheless, in order to have these forms, some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect.

sometimes, imagination of philosophy issue is more important and more difficult than its judgment, and principality of existence issue is from these issues. in this article, we have surveyed to some of imagination meanings of this issue.also we have surveyed to two explanation of disputable point; and we have surveyed with reasons of principality of existence to some of imagination meanings. explanation of disputable point, which is an important issue in this field, is not mentioned in Mullah Sadra's books. But people like Sabzevari, Tabatabai and others have paid it. In the meantime, modares Zunuzi has written a comprehensive and precise explanation of disputable point on the issue. Some have criticized this and we have responded to them. In this article, the meanings of the quiddity, existence, imagination meanings, and limitation of the dispute are discussed. It addresses issues such as whether there are personal or some kind of phenomena in this issue.