جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Fundamentalism » در نشریات گروه « علوم سیاسی »

Saudi Arabia is trying to achieve leadership in the Islamic world and the position of a major regional power. This country is a traditional political regime in favor of Hanafi-Salafi Islam, a supporter of traditional regimes and fundamentalist Salafi movements in the Middle East region. The spread of Saudi Arabia's role as a supporter of Sunni fundamentalist can also be seen in regions such as Central Asia. The above issue is effective on the security complex of Central Asia and the security of this countries. Russia, China and especially Iran are also facing the transformation in the system of these collections and they are reacting to it. The purpose of this article is to investigate this issue. The question of this article states that: What effects have Saudi Arabia's actions in strengthening Salafist fundamentalism in Central Asia had on the framework of the security complex of Central Asian countries? The hypothesis of the article states that due to Saudi Arabia's use of the religious identity factor to influence the Central Asian region, by supporting movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Islamic Renaissance, it has caused the spread of the idea of caliphate among the Sunni Hanafi majority in Central Asia. Securitization and the dual emergence of growth or weakening of security regionalism is the result of Saudi Arabia's security measures in Central Asia. In this context, with the intensification of the threat component, the possibility of security regionalism has, and the competition between political units in Central Asia has increased.

Arab uprisings, interpreted by many as spring or awakening, failed in its core objectives of achieving freedom and democracy. The path to freedom by these nations soonwas highjacked and replaced by violence. This includes Islamic Fundamentalist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, authoritarian regimes, and militant groups in Iraq, Syria and Yemen have displayed new dimensions of unbridled violence through the capacity of audio-visual media. In fact, violence has become an instrument for various political and military actors to represent their strength through it in these regions. Hence, the importance of this variable and the role it plays in recent developments in the countries as part of the Arab uprisings has led the authors to study the causes and consequences of the formation of violence, especially with political motives, around the question of what are the central characteristics of political violence from Dellaporta's point of view? Therefore, in this study an attempt is made to analyze this phenomenon in an intellectual and discourse format with an analytical-explanatory approach and by referring to Donatella Dellaporta's opinions in the field of political violence by referring to library and internet sources. The research hypothesis is based on the principle that political violence, especially hidden violence, is a complex and multidimensional process that has its own mechanisms. In fact, hidden political violence is the result of multi-faceted interaction and confrontation between the government and social groups and activists according to the available facilities and capacities.

Today the main threat to governmental actors at the international level comes from emerging non-governmental actors, so at this point, security cooperation is needed between Russia and Iran to counter fundamentalism and terrorism in the Middle East. The purpose of the present study is to answer how the subject of terrorism and fundamentalism has fostered cooperation between Russia and Iran. The research method is descriptive-analytic and the theoretical approach of neorealism has been used. The research relies on the hypothesis that the common goals between two countries to counter fundamentalism have improved their cooperation and transformed bilateral ties between Tehran-Moscow. The results showed that although the level of cooperation between Iran and Russia has been improved, the complexity of globally and regionally structural and realistic approaches has removed special strategic ties between them.

In Syria and Yemen, the apparent power of ethnic and religious groups has led to civil war, rooted in the identity issues of these societies. Under the consensus cultural variable is the component of identity, which is one of the main factors and the foundation of the so-called Arab Spring developments. The majority of Arab societies suffer from the lack of national identity due to the plurality of ethnic and religious groups, which puts some groups in a superior political position and pushes others to the margins. Identity is at the top of the Arab developments, and other factors are placed below it. Even the difference in the process of developments in these societies is due to the identity issue. The aim of this research is to investigate the role of identity in the formation, results, and trends of recent developments in the Arab Middle East using constructivism in a descriptive and analytical way. The article's main question is, "What effect has the identity and identitarianism of ethnic and religious groups of Arab societies had on the formation and process of recent developments of these societies?" The findings indicate that the social structure of most Arab societies is very plural. Muslim groups in Arab countries are not cohesive, and there are many religious sects that fuel the religious divide of these societies. The biggest gap is between Shia and Sunni. The difference in the fundamentals of the belief principles of the various Sunni sects has led to their identity split. The Brotherhood, Salafism, and radical fundamentalism are the most effective identity discourses of the Sunni sect, which, along with the Shiites, try to spread their intellectual values and norms in Arab societies. The most prominent ethnic divide is related to the Kurdish ethnicity, which in countries such as Syria and Iraq pursue a different identity from the Arab ethnic groups due to their cultural values. Due to the lack of common norms in Arab societies, a common identity has not been formed in these countries, and we are facing a plurality of identities that are rooted in contradictions and conflicts. This is why during the Arab developments, three groups of fundamentalists, Shiites, and Kurds have become highly active in the analysis of identity action, and it is not possible to solve the crises of these societies without considering their demands.
When the political units do not pay attention to the intellectual, perceptive, normative, and identity components of the citizens, it is natural that conflicts between the government and the society will be created. This is what has been objectified in the Arab societies of the Middle East. The Arab totalitarian governments, by creating a fence around themselves, have actually limited the political and economic structure to their families and those around them and do not care about other peoples.
Therefore, what was formed in the Arab Middle East in 2011 cannot be unrelated to the ethnic-religious intellectual and normative patterns of this region. Even the trends and differences in the developments of Arab societies are not unrelated to the plural identity of these societies. The more cohesive the country is in terms of social structure, the faster the social movement ends, and we do not witness civil war or the presence of other countries in the course of the developments of these societies. A clear example of that is Egypt and Tunisia, where the overthrow of the governments resulted in relative peace in a short period of time. The lack of active ethnic-religious identities and their relatively coherent social structure caused the shortness of the transition period, low violence, and non-intervention of other countries in the course of the developments of these societies. However, identity pluralism in some societies such as Syria, Yemen, and to some extent Libya pushed the developments in another direction. In these societies, the depth of the identity difference is such that none of the parties backed down from their position, and the protests progressed towards civil war and widespread crisis. The identity and ideological war stemming from dry religious interpretations led to widespread violence in societies such as Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The presence of active identity groups in the developments of these societies followed the reaction of transnational actors in the field of supporting identity groups close to them, which ultimately results in the prolongation of the crisis and proxy wars.

The conceptual duality of good and right is one of the most basic issues of political thought,. The superiority and inferiority of these two concepts to each other has been a matter of dispute between even modern political philosophers such as Kant and Rawls. In this article, an attempt has been made to check and analyze the dominant view of the discourses of the Islamic Republic on these two concepts, and if there is one or both of them in these discourses, their precedence and backwardness are also examined. Therefore, by assuming the importance of these two concepts in looking of the political , in this article, we try to find out: How has this duality been reflected in the dominant political discourses in the Islamic Republic? Is it possible to find traces of this duality in the system of intra-discourse meanings and inter-discourse confrontations in the political field after the Islamic Revolution of Iran? The analysis method of this article is based on discourse theory. In the theoretical framework, while referring to the conceptual discussions about the duality of good and right, we have put more emphasis on John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness, which, while trying to present a combination between the categories of right and good, places logical precedence over right. The findings of the research show that the two dominant discourses of reformism/ principalism and their predecessors in the period of the Islamic Republic basically have benevolent approaches and were aimed at an idealistic goal.

The failure of ISIS' Jihad Fatah strategy has caused it to be put on the agenda as a component of adapting to new conditions and a new terrorist strategy. Based on that, a new organizational structure was developed according to the information elites of the competitors. This problem accelerates the attacks, the secrecy of these attacks, the use of virtual layers of internet communication, membership and internet operations, which greatly reduces the ability of security organizations to deal with these groups. In recent years, extremism, fundamentalism and terrorism have spread across the ideological spectrum with a "post-organizational" trend. In this process, with the increase of online activities, the membership and support of specific groups has become more ambiguous and the growth of transnational movements has flowed more fluidly. Terrorist attacks are carried out by people who have no clear connection with the identified organizations, but a kind of similar method and common ideology can be seen in all of them. In this article, with the assumption that extremism will spread in the form of "post-organizationalism" in the coming years, we want to answer the question, what are the components, variables, and structure of modern terrorism based on post-organizationalism? The purpose of this article is to analyze and identify the virtual content of post-organizational fundamentalism as the fourth generation of terrorism by using the results of several survey studies and providing examples. The findings of this research confirm the hypothesis that the fourth wave of fundamentalism is manifested in the form of post-organizationalism.
Extremism is a kind of semantic and socially constructed structure that is studied at the three levels of the basics of thought, belief and behavior. Regarding the formation of the extreme Salafist movement, which is a concrete type of contemporary extremism, the analysis of a historical background shows; Intellectually, this current has its roots in Hanbali jurisprudence, hadithism and thoughts such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and in the form of the religious understanding of the Salaf, it produces beliefs such as heresy and ignorance, certain rules and norms of behavior based on takfir and jihad. However, the discussion about the normative roots and doctrines of extremism in the Islamic world cannot explain the reasons for its formation and expansion. As the action of contemporary extremists shows, external structures at different national, regional and international levels have had important effects on their understanding, identification and role finding. Based on this, we must perceive Salafi terrorism as one of the most important dynamics of the Islamic world and as an international security crisis over several decades in a combined framework including the identity of the foundation, the internal base culture, and external structural pressures. This combined process based on construction in a historical context has led to the emergence of numerous groups and generations of terrorist extremism. Now, with the physical end of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, an important issue is the future of extreme Salafism in the Islamic world. Because examining the order governing the evolution of extremism in the Islamic world and the future possibilities of extremism, while being a suitable platform for improving the scientific understanding of the dynamics of the Islamic world and relations at the level of the international structure, will also have strategic dimensions for the national security of the Islamic Republic. Because, on the one hand, structural developments at the international level in the field of terrorism are important for the Islamic Republic as an influential regional player in the Islamic world, and on the other hand, the threat of takfiri terrorism is still considered a threat to the future of the Islamic world. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the order governing the process of extremist Salafist developments in order to determine the factors affecting the future trends of Salafist extremism and their new way of acting.
After the London Bridge attack in June 2017, British Prime Minister Theresa May warned that social media companies, including Twitter and Facebook, must eradicate extremist safe spaces. Speaking at the Global Forum in Davos in January 2018, he said, "Tech companies still need more programs to step up their responsibilities to deal with malicious and illegal corporate online activities." Companies cannot be neutral when their operating systems deal with extremist and terrorist content. He was probably concerned about the use of the Internet, especially social networks, for violent purposes, terrorist purposes, and their supporters (academic groups, policymakers, and the general public). This concern is due to the apparent connections between Internet networks, the content of violent extremist and terrorist activities online, and the application of extremist ideology that has been used for terrorist groups or movements or planning attacks. Apparently, the easy access to a huge amount of terrorist and violent extremist content on popular social networks is a major concern. Twitter has come under increased scrutiny due to their response to the use of its infrastructure by ISIS, also known as ISIS. Experts from the British Homeland Security confirmed at the time that this attack was the first terrorist attack to date that was planned from start to finish on social networks. The London Bridge attacks were presented as the beginning of post-organizationalism in extremism and terrorism.
In this article, assuming that the phenomenon of post-organizationalism will be discussed as a new leadership model of terrorism in the future generations of Salafis, we are looking for the answer to the question, what are the components of the new post-organizationalism? Then, with the approach that post-organizationalism is considered as the fourth structural evolution of extreme Salafism after solidarity jihad, spatial jihad and restoration of caliphate and jihad of conquest, we examine the dimensions of modern terrorism in this structure.
From the ideological point of view, Islamic extremism is equal to the Islamic form of traditional extreme conservatism ideology in Islamic societies. In this model, there are also the basic elements of traditional western conservatism; Issues such as the belief that humans have become evil and society has become corrupt, calling for a return to the past that is better than destroyed and high traditions, opposing social changes, focusing on moral principles, demonizing enemies and extreme policies. In addition, there is a tendency to combine the church and the state and the rule of good people in Christianity in Islamic extremism as Oliver Roy said: fundamentalists have many similar characteristics, perhaps the first and most important of which is Western Christian fundamentalists. Roy believes that the essence of fundamentalism is tied to concepts such as identity, and issues such as identity, society, education and social construction are still the most important factors in societies' tendency towards fundamentalism, concepts that are defined as constructivism in international relations.

The present research was conducted with the aim of investigating the main elements of the discourse of the government after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and to explain the main elements of the discourse, Laclau and Mouffe's discourse approach and descriptive books and research articles were used. Since every discourse has signifiers, the findings of the research show that the reformist discourse forms signs such as freedom, legalism, religious democracy, human rights, and having fair and free relations with the whole world around the central signifier of the people. They gave. On the other hand, fundamentalists have formed their semantic system by adding signs such as justice, security, values, cultural invasion, etc. around the central sign of the province.

Islamic groups have been instrumental in the 1990s developments in Central Asia. Taking advantage of the deep roots of Islamic beliefs and tendencies in the region, these groups have organized extensive efforts. The question of the present study, which is descriptive-analytical and collected with library documents, is what effect does Islamic fundamentalism have on security in Central Asia? The research hypothesis in response to the question is that religious fundamentalism is not the main factor influencing the security of Central Asia; But it retains a certain influence. The Islamic factor first plays a role in the domestic politics of Central Asian countries and second in the segregated neighbors.

Religious democracy has emerged as a novel concept in the political and cultural space of our society and has presented itself as a political philosophy and a special and independent model of government, as opposed to political philosophies and alternative models of government, especially secularism and fundamentalism. The main claim of religious democracy in Iran is that without a purely materialistic view of customary, humanistic, individualistic and commercial principles; A popular government can be established, but based on religious values ​​and within the framework of divine commandments. In fact, the main point of the research is that so far no serious attempt has been made to compare the three types of alternative political systems (religious democracy, secularism and fundamentalism) in order to show their differences or possibly some similarities. In this article, using a descriptive-analytical method based on logical reasoning, we make a comparative comparison between religious democracy and secularism and fundamentalism in order to enumerate their differences and commonalities, components and indicators of democracy. Let us also explain religion.

The Muslim Brotherhood movement is the most important movement claiming political Islam in the Sunni world. This movement, centered in Egypt, has many branches in Islamic and Arab countries. The Muslim Brotherhood, which is the most ideologically cohesive movement among the Islamist movements in the Arab world, has always formed its ideals and ideologies by believing in political Islam. The ideological principles of the Muslim Brotherhood must be found in the thoughts of its founder, Hassan al-Banna. Over time and under environmental conditions, this movement has made changes in its ideas and principles that distinguish it from the traditional Brotherhood or the Conservative Brotherhood. This development can be followed in two stages. In fact, after the martyrdom of Hassan al-Banna, and specifically since Omar Telsmani, this ideological transformation began in the Brotherhood, and the next stage of this transformation, which was a continuation of the previous path, became concrete after the Brotherhood came to power in Egypt after the 2011 Arab transformations. Given the importance of understanding these approaches and ideological metamorphosis, in this article, using descriptive-analytical method and library tools, seeks to answer the question of how the approaches and ideological developments of the Muslim Brotherhood movement since the martyrdom of Hassan al-Banna until now. And in what areas has it been?The findings of the article show that the Muslim Brotherhood since Omar Telsmani about the nature of government, the type of confrontation with the government, the method of participation in society and political activities in internal sphere.

Currently, some important Jewish communities in Israel live primarily in the media because of their particular lifestyle and isolationism. They have specific beliefs and particular personal and social lifestyles that are mainly rooted in ancient Judaism. The opinions and beliefs of this community are in line with Jewish (pragmatic) fundamentalists, and therefore hold to the Jewish fundamentalist mandates. The ideas of the community in the social and political context, along with their growing importance - by rapid population growth and effective political presence - have made them an influential stream. Given their efforts to be more influential (in the context of fundamentalist discourse) - particularly in the political arena - and in view of their principles and objectives as well as the demographic and political structure of Israel, it seems that reinforcing this trend will increase tensions. And there will be an increase in extremist tendencies in the Israeli regime and even will include fundamental questions about the identity of the present Israel regime and its future.

Nasr refers to tradition, laws and nomenclature that originate from the divine origin, regardless of time and place, are different from customs, habits and everything that brings to mind the color and meaning of antiquity and wear and tear. Tradition, in this sense, confronts modernism as a philosophical system and humanism, which presents the absolute truth not on God but on a human level. The article seeks to answer two questions. First, what is the relationship between tradition and modernism based on the four logical genealogies from Nasr's point of view? Second, how is his thinking reflected in politics and government? In order of the mentioned questions, two hypotheses can be proposed. First, the relationship between tradition and modernism is contrasting. Second, the reflection of Nasr's thought in politics and government is fundamentalism in its unconventional sense. The research method is descriptive-analytical, which has been compiled by collecting data through documentary and library sources. The results show that tradition and modernism are fundamentally different from each other in terms of paradigm, and from the heart of tradition in the political arena, only a traditional and fundamentalist government will emerge, but in its unconventional sense.

The present article has been written with the aim of explaining the initiative of the third way of Seyyed Jamal ol Din Asadabadi in leading the Islamic society to the new age. Given the political and social conditions of his time, he sought to open a third path between the Salafi traditionalists and the Western modernists to the new age. Seyyed Jamal tried to compile an Islamic version of modernity and present it to Muslim communities with the authority of religion. Seyyed Jamal's main initiative in this way was to distinguish between the concept of "religion" and "tradition" on the one hand, and to distinguish between the concept of "culture" and "Western science and technology" on the other. But despite Seyyed Jamal's wishes, the third way eventually strengthened Salafism and fundamentalism in the Islamic world. In this article, using contextual methods, especially the history of concepts, the reasons and causes of such a thing have been studied. The separation of religion from the culture and tradition of Islamic societies at that time, in order to present a universal version of religion, strengthened the concept of Salafism and finally strengthened the dual concept of secularism and Salafism, which led to fundamentalism

In this study, the statements and propaganda of the candidates of the tenth election of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran have been examined by discourse analysis. Discourse analysis in this study showed that a kind of change has taken place in the discourse of moderation and reform, and this discourse, as in the previous period, helped to re-establish this discourse in the Iranian political arena by using the validity and access of discourse. The semantic system of the discourse of moderation and reform, by expressing concepts such as Barjam, women's rights, the positive performance of the sixth parliament, freedom, legalism, and economic prosperity, has followed the path of the 1992 elections and is opposed to the discourse of fundamentalism. This discourse was able to create populism in absorbing and using the elements of discourse, and by deconstructing the previous discourse and having the power of discourse, it was able to provide the monic dominance of this discourse. The discourse of fundamentalism in this period has been alienated from the discourse of moderation, reform and rationality. The coalition of fundamentalists in this period is one of the elements of the progress of the discourse of fundamentalism compared to the previous elections. Attention to the concepts of the Islamic Revolution discourse, livelihood, progress, security, resistance economy has been drawn alongside the sign of the province.

Survey of rivals, collides and conflicts of religions and cultures are considered fundamental issues of cultural studies (contrast), and it is suitable geopolitical issues to study. In the contemporary age, conflicts among Islam. Jew and west civilization stemmed from traditions and views of Christianity religion are of very important and many parts of cultural studies have dedicated to it. Europeans attempts to control and overcome Middle East and Iran date back to British attack, crusaders and romans. The west knew that the most way to take and permanent hegemony on a territory is to dwell there.. Findings of the research show that America and west to prevent of unity of Islamic countries and seize of theirs sources use several technics including Yinon plan. Progression of the Arab and Israel peace plan, prevention of exert or apply power of Iraq on the pricing and direct supply of oil, showing Iran. Iraq and Syria as a danger and in result, making excuse to long presence in this countries and imposition pressure to break of these countries to distance them from Iran and resistance countries, prevention of export of Islamic revolution are most important of goals of the west and Yinon plan.

Theology of the New-Salafism, like the traditional Salafism believes in a literal interpretation of the texts, it values practice and it has an affinity with technology. New-Salafists, comparing to the traditional Salafi movement, and Vahhabi Salafi, has a more conciliatory approach toward the Western world, women’s right and modernity. Besides, due to the attractive promises, plain literature, and no theological complexities, the New-Salafism has attracted so many Muslims and non-Muslims all around the world. In this study we will introduce Muhammad-ibn Abdul Rahman Al’ Arifi, one of the New-Salafi thinkers. We will examine his books and his influence among social media to investigate the relationship between the rhetoric and literature used in books of this contemporary New-Salafi thinker and his popularity in Islamic world, specifically. As for the lack of studies in this field, it was necessary to refer to the most of his translated books and to classify them according to subjects and their structure in order to get a more comprehensive look on the works and thoughts of this thinker. In this study, we have used heuristic method.

In recent decades, for important reasons such as the end of the Cold War, the rapid expansion of globalization, the expansion of communication, we have seen researchers pay too much attention to the issue of fundamentalism. Of course, fundamentalism comes in many forms, but what is more important than any other issue is religious fundamentalism, which received a lot of attention with the rise of ISIS . However, fundamentalism has existed in Christianity as well as in Judaism. The common denominator of religious fundamentalism is the attempt to revive religious values. Some argue that religious fundamentalism, as a general, conservative, and rebellious tendency, is based on the normative rotations of modernity. Therefore, this article seeks to answer the question analytically and descriptively , what are the factors influencing the emergence and tendency to fundamentalism? Findings Research shows that on the one hand the environmental failures of society and on the other hand the fear of the consequences of modernity and globalization have led to the spread of social, political, cultural and economic spheres and the fundamentalists are trying to return to tradition to solve these shortcomings.

Investigating the political attitude of citizens is an issue that has a special place in our society; Attitudes are the basis for the formation of behaviors and actions of individuals. On the other hand, the issue of the importance of finding national and ethnic identities in the age of globalization is the most important issue in political sociology. In this regard, it seems that one of the factors that can influence people's political attitude is their national and ethnic identities. Given that experimental data has not been provided in this regard, it is necessary to measure the overview of this issue.The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of national and ethnic identities on the political attitudes of individuals. The statistical population of this research is Khoy city in West Azarbaijan province, which was studied by 398 inhabitants of this city by quota sampling method. The results of the research show that, firstly, according to the Mead views, there is a difference between national identity and ethnic identities, not contradictions, but rather a positive relationship, each of which goes up by reinforcing another's identity. Secondly, although these two types of identities are well-matched, their effects on the political attitudes of citizens are different. In this regard, the findings suggest that while increasing national identity tends to bring citizens closer to fundamentalism, ethnic identity reinforces the likelihood of individuals turning into reformist political groups in the community.

In discourse about countering terrorism, the term "radicalization" is widely used, but remains poorly defined. To focus narrowly on ideological radicalization risks implying that radical beliefs are a proxy—or at least a necessary precursor—for terrorism, though we know this not to be true. Different pathways and mechanisms of terrorism involvement operate in different ways for different people at different points in time and perhaps in different contexts. This article explores the problems in defining radicalization and radicalism, and suggests that radicalization—and more specifically, involvement in terrorism—might best be viewed as a set of diverse processes. It goes on to review several potentially promising theories that might support further study of those processes, including social movement theory, social psychology, and conversion theory. Finally, it describes some possible frameworks for understanding how the processes might facilitate terrorism-related behavior.